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ABSTRACT 
   
A large number of systems that rely on the Internet pervasively launched into our 
daily lives during the last decades. The openness and scalability of the Internet have 
provided a flexible platform for private customers, professionals, and academics with 
non-commercial or commercial interests. Therefore, there has been growing interest in 
network security. Network or computer systems may employ anti-virus, firewall, 
intrusion prevention system, or intrusion detection system to maintain the safe 
environment. Among the systems, the intrusion detection system plays a very 
important role in minimizing the damage caused by different attacks. The system 
attempts to learn the features of behaviors and events of system and/or users over a 
period time to build a profile of normal behaviors, then looks for malicious behaviors 
that deviate from the normal profile. Thus, it is able to detect attacks even when 
detailed information of the attack does not exist. 
A wide variety of techniques were proposed to approach the system including 
machine learning, data mining, hidden Markov models, and statistical analysis. This 
research mainly considers the statistical analysis-based method due to the simplicity 
and effectiveness. However, the method has a few disadvantages. First, the results are 
not intuitive because it requires the related statistical background. Second, it is 
difficult to integrate the results of different statistical analyses due to the different 
ranges. Last, the methods provide only two states; normal or malicious behaviors. 
This research proposes a trust management scheme as a solution to these 
problems. A trust management scheme is able to scale the results of statistical analyses 
 
 
between 0 (unreliable) and 1 (reliable), so the results would not only be intuitive but 
also be able to integrate the various results into one. Moreover, the trust values can 
provide more than normal and malicious behaviors, such as a-little-suspicious, 
suspicious, or highly-suspicious states.  
We will show how well the trust management scheme can represent the results of 
various statistical analyses, how the system can find the appropriate thresholds for 
classifying the malicious behaviors in this dissertation. The proposed trust 
management scheme will be applied to two real-world datasets, and we will discuss 
the experiments results. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The internet along with the corporate network plays a major role in work/personal 
use and has evolved into a global communication and service network. As of 2013, 
83.3% of the United States households reported computer ownership, and 74.4% of all 
households reported Internet use [1]. The openness and scalability of the Internet have 
provided a flexible platform for private customers, professionals, and academics, with 
non-commercial or commercial interests. For instance, electronic commerce, social 
networking, and national infrastructure for which delivering oil, gas, power, and 
water, rely on access to the information network. However, there exist various threat 
sources and vulnerabilities including software bugs, operating system bugs, and 
operating system misconfigurations. The number of the new threats continues to grow, 
and the creation of new malware was observed an average of 230,000 new types each 
day in the second quarter of 2015. Moreover, a total of 21 million new threats were 
observed during the three months [2].  
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
In recent years, there has been growing interest in network intrusion detection due 
to the emergence of various kinds of large-scale distributed systems, such as Internet, 
server clusters, cellular networks, computer networks, distributed databases, network 
file systems, etc. Networks are complex interacting systems, where failures and 
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attacks are common. Therefore, network-monitoring systems that are used for 
identifying, diagnosing and treating anomalies, have become a fundamental part of 
network operations. Without this kind of monitoring systems, networks are not able to 
operate efficiently or reliably. Anomaly detection is one of the intrusion detection 
monitoring methods that characterizes known or unknown anomalous patterns of an 
attack, a virus, or a malware. There are many proposals for anomaly detection 
methods that are based on pattern, rule, state, integration, or statistical analysis of the 
data that can be collected, for example, at the firewall of a given computer system. 
Such data usually represents network flows that consist of transaction time, content 
type, source IP address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, IP 
protocol, size of sent and received packets, source country, destination country, packet 
contents, etc. The data will provide an accurate detection of malicious nodes if an 
Anomaly Detection System (ADS) can analyze every network flow separately. 
However, it might not be possible due to the physical and practical limits to the 
amount of data storage and computation because the number of network flows are 
huge. For instance, the data considered in this dissertation has been collected from one 
of the network firewalls at the University of Rhode Island consists of more than 3.6 
billion network flows during the 90 days from February 10th to May 28th. Since each 
flow includes chunks of multiple packets that have been exchanged between a source 
node and a destination node, the actual number of packets that have been observed 
was much bigger than 3.6 billion. Thus, this dissertation attempts to reduce the dataset 
to be analyzed to detect malicious behaviors. 
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 The term network refers simply to a collection of elements and their inter-
relations [3]. The relationships between the nodes in a network can be presented as a 
graph, and it allows us to apply various graph theory techniques for a statistical 
analysis-based Anomaly Detection System (ADS). One of the advantages of the graph 
is that we can reduce the amount of data that needs to be analyzed because the 
duplicate relationships between nodes can be presented on one edge in a graph. We 
analyzed the generated graphs from network flows data with statistical analysis 
methods that assume the normal data instances occur in high probability regions while 
malicious data instances occur in low probability regions.  
To create appropriate rules for decision-making about network node behaviors in 
a dynamic network environment, we adopted an outlier detection method from the 
financial analysis [4]. The nodes in a dynamic network environment, such as the 
Internet, show different behaviors over time because the network topology changes 
and nodes and/or edges may come and go. Thus, a threshold, which detects malicious 
behaviors, needs to be dynamically selected depending on the given dataset, and we 
used the outlier detection method to implement an adaptive threshold. The adaptive 
threshold detects malicious behaviors and is used for a trust management scheme that 
is introduced in next paragraph. 
The concept of trust and the trust management schemes adopted from the social 
science will help to express a large amount of past data implicitly by providing a 
cumulative evaluation method for each node. Also, by construction the trust 
management scheme will help to convert the various ranges of the graph-based node 
characteristics and behaviors into a measure of trust with a fixed range of values 
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between zero and one, where a value close to zero indicates less trustful while a value 
close to one indicates more trustful. Since each statistical analysis method produces 
different ranges of results, the related statistical background will be required to 
understand the results. The big numbers may represent malicious behaviors in some 
statistical analysis methods while the numbers can represent normal behaviors in some 
methods. If we convert the results of each statistical analysis via the trust management 
schemes, they can be expressed as understandable information without the related 
statistical background in a fixed range of values between zero (less trustful) and one 
(trustful). Using trust values computed from multiple node characteristics for the same 
node can be integrated into one single measure that will reflect the overall level of 
maliciousness of the node.  
Note that in this dissertation, the trust scheme originally proposed by [5] has been 
modified to allow indicating how close a behavior to the normal behavior and 
malicious behavior.  
 
1.2 Research goals 
An efficient statistical analysis-based ADS needs to: a) store and analyze less 
data, b) be able to deal with compressed, encrypted, or fragmented packets, c) show 
low false positive rate, and d) create appropriate rules for decision-making about 
network node behaviors in a dynamic network environment.  
First of all, this dissertation uses graph-based statistical analysis method because 
a graph can reduce the amount of data by presenting the relationships between nodes 
on one edge, and the method focuses on the unencrypted and uncompressed part of the 
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network packets, for example, the source IP address, destination IP address, source 
port, and destination port. To implement the graph-based analysis, the ADS needs to 
represent data as Network Graph(s). Second, we develop 1) a trust management 
scheme to avoid erroneously labeling nodes with a few malicious behaviors and 2) an 
outlier-based adaptive threshold to create appropriate rules for decision-making about 
network node behaviors in a dynamic cyber environment. A statistical analysis method 
detects malicious behaviors that occur in low probability regions, and the evaluation 
should be careful to minimize its false positive rate. Moreover, the analysis should be 
able to adapt to a dynamic network environment, such as the Internet, to maintain an 
appropriate detection rate. 
This dissertation aims to achieve the following goals. First, we will represent the 
network flows dataset as Network Graph(s). Second, the behaviors of each node will 
be characterized by using graph-based analysis. Third, the system will detect 
malicious behaviors using statistical analysis method. Fourth, we will develop a 
dynamic threshold method, so that the ADS can adapt to a dynamic cyber 
environment. Last, each node will be evaluated based on aggregate behavior over time 
to ensure that no one behavior causes the node to be labeled as malicious.  
 
1.3 Data description 
The proposed anomaly detection system will be evaluated using two different 
datasets. The first dataset was collected by European Internet Service Provider in 
2007, and the second dataset was collected at the firewall of the University of Rhode 
Island (URI) computer network in 2014. 
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The first dataset is the same dataset that was used by Ding et al. in [6] for intrusion 
detection via community-based method (Section 2.2.2). The dataset contains network 
flows collected by a European Internet Service Provider (ISP), sampled based on 
1:1000 packet sampling rate, and stored over 14 days from May, 1st to May, 14th in 
2007. Totally, 34,647,824 network flows were collected from 43,016 unique source 
nodes to 1,449,598 unique destination nodes where each flow is represented by a 
source port, a destination port, time and duration of the flow, and size in bytes and 
packets. Additionally, the dataset contains DShield Logs obtained from a community-
based collaborative firewall log correlation system by the SANS Institute [7]. The 
DShield Logs contains 9,724,227 unique IP addresses marked as possibly malicious. 
Although not complete, DShield Logs have been proven to be useful for validation of 
proposed intrusion detection methods in a number of studies [6], [12]. 
The second dataset, significantly bigger than the first dataset, contains network 
flows that were collected by University of Rhode Island Information Technology 
Service (URI-ITS) at one of the firewalls in the university, sampled based on 1:100 
packet sampling rate, and stored from February 11th to May 22nd in 2014 for 90 days. 
Totally, 36,986,233 network flows were observed that access from/to the University of 
Rhode Island (URI) Network. 8,616 nodes belonged to the URI Network among 
19,468,221 unique source nodes, and 31,279 nodes belonged to the URI Network 
among 528,222 unique destination nodes where each flow is represented by a source 
port, a destination port, time and duration of the flow, size in bytes and packets, a type 
of application, a sequence number, an action, a flags, a source country, a destination 
country, etc.  
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There have been a few special events while collecting the flows. One of the 
servers in URI network was attacked on March 6th, so the collection was stopped at 
23:59:59. We started collecting the flows on March 11th again, but there was another 
attack. The collection needed to be stopped at 06:15:57, and we started the collection 
at 15:26:08 next day. We had to stop the collection at 15:27:23 on April 22nd again due 
to another attack and resumed the collection at 12:00:50 on May 6th.  
 
1.4 Dissertation Structure 
Chapter 2 will present the background and related scholar research work in 
statistical analysis-based Anomaly Detection System (ADS) and trust management 
scheme. The chapter will give reviews of the types of intrusions, types of ADS, graph 
theory, statistical analysis methods, adaptive threshold, and trust management scheme 
that have been used in this dissertation. Chapter 3 will propose a new method for 
detecting malicious nodes from network flows based on a statistical analysis-based 
anomaly detection by representing the results by using trust. This chapter also 
introduces an adaptive threshold that creates appropriate rules for decision-making in a 
dynamic cyber environment. Chapter 4 will provide descriptions of each experiment 
design and the results that have been composed for evaluating the goals of this 
dissertation. The experiments will show 1) network graph can reduce the dataset, 2) 
graph-based analysis can characterize each node’s behaviors, 3) the proposed trust 
management scheme can be used to represent the statistical characteristics that we are 
investigating, 4) the proposed adaptive threshold performs better than static thresholds 
in a dynamic environment, and 5) the trust management will evaluate each node in 
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aggregate and over time. Chapter 5 of this dissertation will discuss how this work has 
met the goals specified in Section 1.2 and summarize findings for the experiments in 
Chapter 4. The future direction of the research work is also discussed in the chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 
A variety of methods has been proposed and developed for the purpose of 
intrusion detection. Some methods detect malicious nodes by matching the traffic 
pattern or the packets using a set of predefined rules that have been already known. On 
the other hand, some methods monitor the behaviors over time and detect malicious 
behaviors without the predefined rules. These methods can implement an Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) and protect the system from various threats. This dissertation 
approached the latter method to implement an IDS based on statistical analysis 
methods. 
This chapter presents the related works of this dissertation. Section 2.1 provides 
an introduction to IDS. Section 2.2 discusses the statistical analysis-based anomaly 
detection systems, the related definitions, the statistical analysis methods, and 
terminology that are used in this dissertation. Section 2.3 introduces the related graph 
theory, and Section 2.4 provides an introduction to trust management schemes that can 
evaluate. Section 2.5 discusses an outlier detection method to implement an adaptive 
threshold to create appropriate rules in a dynamic network environment, and Section 
2.6 overviews the potential intrusions to computer and computer networks. Section 2.7 
summarizes this chapter and discusses how the reviewed studies contributed to this 
research. 
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2.1 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
For a clear understanding of ADS, we need to know IDS first. In recent years, the 
attacks have been sophisticated, and new vulnerabilities (known as Zero-day exploits) 
are routinely brought. As complete prevention of computer attacks is not possible, the 
IDSs play a very important role in minimizing the damage caused by different attacks. 
An IDS is a special purpose device or software to detect suspicious behaviors, such as 
unauthorized access to a computer system or a network. The concept of IDS was first 
introduced by James P. Anderson [8] and formed by Dorothy Denning [9] in 1980 and 
1987 respectively. An IDS audits activities performed in computer systems and 
networks, then analyzes the data to find evidence of malicious behaviors. The 
activities can be network packets, operating system calls, audit records produced by 
operating system auditing facilities, or log messages produced by applications [10]. 
When IDS detects an attack, an alert that describes the type of the attack is provided. 
There are two complementary trends in intrusion detection for IDS: misuse 
detection and anomaly detection [11]. Misuse detection is also known as knowledge-
based detection that aims to identify patterns of known bad behavior. On the other 
hand, anomaly detection is known as behavior-based detection that builds a profile of 
the normal operation from the historical data of the activities of system and/or users 
that aims to look for abnormal behavior. These methods can be used together; a 
“hybrid detection” that is based on both the normal behavior of the system and the 
intrusive behavior of the attackers. 
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2.1.1 Misuse Detection 
The misuse detection method analyzes a system and/or user activities and tries to 
find a match between the activities and the definitions or signatures of known attacks 
that have been identified as bad behaviors [12], [13] . Thus, the misuse detection 
method is commonly known as a signature-based method. This method requires 
developing a knowledge database and a rule engine to detect intrusions. 
This method is generally used in commercial products due to its advantages [14]. 
First, misuse detection method is very efficient in detecting attacks with usually high 
levels of accuracy and with a minimal number of false positives [15]. Second, this 
method can quickly detect specially designed intrusion tools and techniques. Last, it 
provides an easy-to-use tool for maintaining and monitoring systems, even if an 
administrator of the systems is not an expert in security [13].  
However, there also exist disadvantages. First, misuse detection method can only 
detect known attacks, so the systems must be updated with newly discovered attack 
definitions or signatures. Second, since this method works on the basis of predefined 
signatures, it is not able to detect attacks when they changed slightly and a variant of 
the attacks is obtained, even if the attacks are well-known [13]. Last, misuse detection 
method is not able to handle compressed, encrypted or fragmented packets because the 
signatures cannot be verified. 
 
2.1.2 Anomaly Detection 
Anomaly detection method attempts to learn the features of behaviors and events 
of system and/or users over a period time to build a profile of normal behaviors, then 
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looks for malicious behaviors that deviate from the normal profile. Thus, anomaly 
detection method is commonly known as a behavior-based method. Since the misuse 
detection method is no longer accurate, this method is typically conceived as a more 
powerful method in academic research due to its theoretical potential for addressing 
novel attacks [14].  
By using a collection of common activities of a user, anomaly detection method 
builds Individual Profile and compares the user’s current behaviors to the profile with 
little deviation from the expected norm. This may cover specific user events. Group 
Profile is built by using a collection of common activities of a group, and it is 
expected that each member in the group follows the group activity patterns. System 
designers are able to build their own profiles for their purposes, such as resource 
profiles or executable profiles [16].   
The advantages of anomaly detection method are as follows [13], [17]. First, 
anomaly detection method is able to detect attacks even when detailed information of 
the attack does not exist. Second, this method can be used to obtain signatures or 
definitions for misuse detection method [13]. Third, it is possible to handle 
compressed, encrypted, or fragmented network packets because the method can be 
implemented by analyzing the header information that does not be compressed, 
encrypted, or fragmented in the Internet. Last, it is less dependent on operating-
system-specific mechanisms [18]. On the other hand, anomaly detection method also 
has disadvantages. First, the high false positive rate is generally cited as the main 
disadvantage of anomaly detection method [13], [18]. Second, this method requires a 
large set of training data in order to construct normal behavior profile and the 
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detection is not available during the learning phase [13]. Moreover, behaviors can 
change over time, so [18] emphasized the importance of the periodic on-line retraining 
of the behavior profile.  
A wide variety of techniques were proposed to approach the anomaly detection 
problem including machine learning [19]–[23], data mining [24]–[30], hidden Markov 
models [31]–[33], and statistical analysis [6], [34]–[39]. This research mainly 
considers the statistical analysis-based method among these methods because it is 
simple and effective to detect known and unknown attacks [28], [40], [41]. Besides, 
the statistical analysis-based method does not require prior knowledge about normal 
activity in order to set limits; instead it learns what constitutes normal activity form its 
observations, and confidence intervals automatically reflect this increase knowledge 
[9]. 
 
2.2 Statistical analysis-based Anomaly Detection System (ADS) 
Statistical analysis-based ADS builds a representation of the network normal 
behavior by using different features of the network traffic data. The system observes 
the activity of subjects and generates profiles to represent their behaviors. Typically, it 
maintains the two profiles that have been discussed in Section 2.1.2; the Individual 
Profile and Group Profile. As new events occur, the method updates the current 
profile and compares it to the previously built profile using some stochastic model 
[42].  The statistical analysis-based ADS assumes that normal data instances occur in 
high probability regions of a stochastic model while malicious data instances occur in 
low probability regions of a stochastic model [43]. Numerous researchers have 
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proposed the statistical analysis-based ADS, and [42] classified them into two 
categories; packet-based and flow-based analysis. 
 
2.2.1 Packet-based statistical analysis 
Packet-based statistical analysis gathers information about individual packets, and 
it analyzes the captured packets directly. Staniford et al. [38] proposed Statistical 
Packet Anomaly Detection Engine (SPADE) that uses a simple frequency-based 
approach. SPADE was specifically designed for detecting port scan attacks. It 
observes the TCP SYN packets over a period time and maintains the anomaly score 
depending on the frequency of a given packet has been seen. Javitz et al. [34] showed 
a statistical analysis-based analysis that maintains statistical profiles, which are Q and 
S statistics, to monitor normal behaviors. The Q statistic represents long-term 
behaviors, and S statistic is deduced from the Q statistic. The S reflects the degree of 
abnormality of recent behavior, and a node with high S value is classified as a 
malicious node. When the most recent value for Q has a low probability of occurrence, 
S has a large value, and vice-versa. In [44], Porras et al. proposed Event Monitoring 
Enabling Responses to Anomalous Live Disturbances (EMERALD). EMERALD 
monitors the behaviors by using four statistical measures; discrete types, numerical 
quantities, traffic intensity, and event distribution. In [39], [45], [46], the authors have 
been interested in the actual contents of the network flows, which is called payload. In 
[39] the Anagram detected malicious by using language-independent n-grams based 
statistical analysis. 1-gram represents the network traffic model that is attack-free and 
statistically analyzes byte-value frequency distributions [47]. The Anagram extended 
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the method to the n-grams analysis that extracts from known malicious packets. To put 
it again, the Anagram computes the mean frequency as well as the variance and 
standard deviation of each ASCII character and compares to the recent packets. Even a 
simple statistical analysis, such as histogram, can be used for detecting intrusions [48].  
A Bayesian network also provides intrusion detection method with an approach 
that models statistical dependencies and causal relationships between system variables 
[49]–[51]. It represents the probabilistic relationships between variables (nodes) and 
their conditional dependencies (links) via a directed acyclic graph. In Bayesian 
approaches, conditional probabilities are used to predict the traffic class of network 
events. Kruegel et al. introduced an event classification-based intrusion detection 
scheme using Bayesian networks in [50]. The method built a decision network based 
on special characteristics of individual attacks. 
 
2.2.2 Flow-based statistical analysis 
The processing and storage resources required for Packet-based analysis have 
increased with the number of captured packets. Moreover, with growing use of 
encrypted and/or compressed packets, the analysis methods have focused more on the 
unencrypted part of the network packets, for example, the source IP address, 
destination IP address, source port, and destination port. Based on the information, 
researchers created network graph models to detect malicious behaviors. Akoglu et al. 
claimed that graph-based approaches are vital and necessary for anomaly detection 
systems for the following four reasons; inter-dependent nature of the data, powerful 
representation, relational nature of problem domains, and robust machinery [52].  
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 Inter-dependent nature of the data: Most relational data could be inter-
dependent, and it is necessary to account for related objects in finding 
anomalies.  
 Powerful representation: The inter-dependencies could be represented by 
links (edges) between the related objects. Graphs effectively capture the long-
range correlations with the multiple paths. This enables representing the 
incorporations of nodes and edge attributes/types. 
 Relational nature of problem domains: The inter-dependencies could exhibit 
anomalies. For example, a failure of a machine could be an indicator of the 
possible other failures of the machine or other machines. 
 Robust machinery: Attackers would not be able to disguise their malicious 
behaviors without knowing the entire characteristics and dynamic operations of 
the normal behaviors. 
 
The graphs can be analyzed based on either structure-based or community-based 
methods. The structure-based method identifies substructures in the graph and finds 
malicious connections. In [53], the authors proposed a Graph-based hierarchical IDS 
(GrIDS), which aims to detect network-wide intrusions that involve connections 
between many nodes. GrIDS construct activity graphs representing hosts and network 
activity, and models an organization as a hierarchy of departments and hosts. Choi et 
al. visualized the structures of attacks by using parallel coordinates in [37]. The 
method displayed several network attacks, such as Denial of Service, Slammer, Host 
scan, and Port scan attacks, on the plane of parallel coordinates by using source IP 
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address, destination IP address, destination port, and the average packet length 
information in a flow.  
The community-based method finds connected groups of nodes in the graph and 
looks for malicious behaviors. Sun et al. developed a method that finds outliers based 
on network clustering method [54]. The authors calculated the core-connectivity-
similarity for each edge in the graph and used a network clustering method, SCAN 
[55], to find the minimum threshold for the outliers. Ding et al. proposed a 
community-based anomaly detection system in [6]. The paper proposed a detection 
system for malicious sources that uses the definition of intrusion in a social 
environment, mainly in order to characterize all the nodes in the network flows.  
This dissertation has its foundations in the work of the flow-based statistical 
analysis over the packet-based statistical analysis because of the advantages of the 
flow-based analysis. First, this analysis method requires less processing and storage 
resources than the packet-based statistical analysis. The method analyzes the header 
information that identifies the source and destination of each packet, and the duplicate 
relationships between nodes will be presented on one edge in a graph. Second, this 
method also analyzes the header information that is an unencrypted part of the 
network packets. Third, it allows us to apply various graph theory techniques for 
statistical analysis methods. 
 
2.2.3 Problems 
As we discussed in Section 1.1, the statistical analysis-based method has a few 
disadvantages. First, the results are not intuitive. The  method in [34] provides two 
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statistical results, which are Q and S statistics, and the human supervisors are required 
to interpret the results with the relative statistical background because the results are 
not intuitive whether the number represents normal or malicious, and how big of a 
number can be considered as a malicious behavior. Second, it is difficult to integrate 
multiple statistical analysis results into one because the statistical analyses generate 
the results in different ranges. For instance, the degrees and betweenness centrality can 
be any number while the clustering coefficient generates a number between 0 and 1. 
Last, the statistical requires a threshold when they detect malicious behaviors. SPADE 
[38] used one of the static thresholds between 9 and 15 to find malicious nodes, and 
the results varied depending on each threshold. Besides, the method provides only the 
normal and malicious states but does not provide how close to normal or malicious. 
Anagram [39] also depends on the static similarity threshold between the profiled 
attack payloads and the recent payloads. This method might provide various states 
depending on how similar the recent payload is to the profiled known attack payloads. 
However, when a smart attacker manipulates the payload, it would not be possible to 
detect the attack. The parallel coordinate method [37] provides fast detection method 
with very nice visualization, but it also requires static thresholds for each attack and 
provides only the normal or malicious states. The community-based anomaly detection 
method [6] depends on statistical analysis results for detecting intruders. The research 
showed betweenness centrality and clustering coefficient are good indicators of the 
intruders. However, the results require knowledge of sophisticated statistical concepts. 
This dissertation proposes a trust management scheme as a solution to these 
problems. A trust management scheme is able to scale the results of statistical analyses 
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between 0 and 1, so the supervisor will know how much the recent behavior or 
accumulated behaviors are close to the normal or malicious behaviors. Since the trust 
management scheme scaled the results of various statistical analyses within the same 
range, they also can be integrated into one with a sophisticated method. Moreover, the 
trust management scheme will provide more than normal and malicious states, such as 
a-little-suspicious, suspicious, or highly-suspicious states. For the last problem, we 
employed an adaptive threshold as the solution. 
 
2.3 Network graphs 
Frequently ‘network’ is used interchangeably with the term ‘graph’ since 
networks are most commonly represented in a formal manner using graphs of various 
kinds [3]. The subfield of mathematics known as graph theory provides a body of 
definitions, tools, techniques, and results for discussing graphs and their properties. In 
this section, we introduce some relevant network graph models that can represent 
network flows and the techniques that can characterize network node behaviors. 
This dissertation has its foundation on a graph-based and a community-based 
anomaly detection system that has been proposed in [6]. The authors proposed a 
detection system for malicious sources that uses the definition of intrusion in a social 
environment, mainly in order to characterize all the nodes in the network flows. The 
authors used the bipartite network graph, bipartite network projection, degree, 
clustering coefficient, and betweenness centrality for the measures in the paper and 
showed that the malicious nodes tend to have relatively high degree, the low clustering 
coefficient and high betweenness centrality. 
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2.3.1 Bipartite network graph 
 
Figure 1. Bipartite graph representation 
 
A bipartite network is a graph 1 2( , , )G V V E , where ଵܸ and ଶܸ are two disjoint 
sets of nodes respectively the top and bottom nodes in Figure 1, and each edge in E 
has one endpoint in ଵܸ  and the other in ଶܸ . This graph is used for representing 
‘membership’ networks. Each edge has endpoints of differing sets, but not between 
nodes in the same set [3]. Bipartite graphs can represent several types of real-world 
data, and Sun et al. claimed that the graph can show interesting characteristics of the 
networks [52], [56], [57].  
 
 Internet: In a network traffic bipartite graph, the edges represent the 
connections between a source node to a destination node, and the differing sets 
are a group of source nodes and a group of destination nodes. The graph of 
connections between source nodes and destination nodes can be direct 
evidence of network attacks, such as Denial of Service, Hostscan, or Portscan 
attacks [6], [37]. 
 P2P systems: The endpoint in ଵܸ is a set of files, and the other in ଶܸ is a set of 
peers. The graph shows the popularity of each file and point of interests of 
each peer depending on the set of files [56]. 
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 Stock markets: Each set represents the traders and stocks respectively. The 
edges show the actions of buying and selling, and it can represent the 
characteristics of the traders and stocks. Besides, it will be useful to identify 
abnormal traders [56]. 
 Research publications: The authors and conferences from ଵܸ  and ଶܸ 
respectively, and the publication relationships were modeled by the edges. The 
graph can be used for grouping the authors depending on the field of interests 
and will show the active authors in the field [56]. The research publication 
bipartite graph can represent the citation networks as well.  
 
As we discussed in Section 2.2.2, the graph-based statistical analysis is interested 
in the relationships between the source and destination nodes. The network flows can 
be represented by source nodes ( ଵܸ ) and destination nodes ( ଶܸ ), and the nodes 
constitute the two disjoint sets. Moreover, each flow has one endpoint in the source 
node set and the other in the destination set (E). Considering these facts, the definition 
of the bipartite graph shows that the graph is enough to represent the network flows 
datasets. 
 
2.3.2 Degree 
In graph theory, the degree represents the number of edges from the vertex and to 
the vertex. In network analysis, it shows the number of connections from a source 
node to the destination nodes [3]. This can be very valuable information that could 
indicate that a source node is an attacker or that a destination node has been attacked 
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by an attack that usually shows high degrees (i.e. DDoS, probing, etc.). In Figure 1, ଵܸ 
and ଶܸ are two disjoint sets of nodes respectively the top and bottom nodes, and each 
edge in E has one endpoint in ଵܸ and the other in ଶܸ. Each source nodes from S1 to 
S11 in the group ଵܸ has out-degrees 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, and 1. On the other hand, 
each destination nodes from D1 to D4 has in-degrees 3, 4, 3, and 3. 
 
2.3.3 Bipartite network projection 
Figure 2. Bipartite network projection of Figure 1 network 
 
A bipartite network projection is an extensively used method for compressing 
information in a bipartite network. If nodes a and b share at least one common 
destination, they are connected in the bipartite network projection [58]. So that the 
projection discovers the community structure of a bipartite network. For the examples 
in Section 2.3.1, 1) the projection of the Internet shows the groups of the source nodes, 
2) it creates different groups based on the interests in P2P systems, 3) the Stock 
market presents the groups of interests in the fields and stocks, and 4) the projection of 
the Research publications can model the co-authorships. Figure 2 shows the one mode 
projection of the Figure 1 network. The bipartite network projection-based community 
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detection approaches were proposed by [6], [57], [59]–[64]. Ding et al. formed a 
projection graph to identify communities in the network and utilized it to find 
malicious nodes, which do not respect community boundaries in [6]. 
 
2.3.4 Clustering coefficient 
 Figure 3. Clustering coefficient 
 
In graph theory, a clustering coefficient is a metric that quantifies the degree how 
much the nodes densely connected each other in a graph and tend to cluster together. 
Clustering coefficient was introduced in social network analysis [65]. The authors 
presented two versions of clustering coefficient; global and local. Global clustering 
coefficient is based on the triangular connections between neighboring three nodes and 
gives an indication of the clustering in the network while Local clustering coefficient 
gives an indication of the embeddedness of single nodes [65].  In network analysis, it 
can be a measure of how source nodes tend to create tightly knit groups [3]. The 
clustering coefficient can be calculated by observing the number of triangles (3-loops) 
that pass through a node and the maximum number of 3-loops that could pass through 
the node.  
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ܥ௡ ≔ ݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ݐݎ݈݅ܽ݊݃݁ݏ ݐ݄ܽݐ ݌ܽݏݏ ݐ݄ݎ݋ݑ݄݃ ݐ݄݁ ݊݋݀݁	݇݉ܽݔ݅݉ݑ݉	݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ݐ݅ݎ݈݅ܽ݊݃݁ݏ ݐ݄ܽݐ ݌ܽݏݏ ݐ݄ݎ݋ݑ݄݃	ݐ݄݁	݊݋݀݁	݇ (1)
[6] showed that low clustering coefficient can be a measurement of intrusion, 
which has the tendency to not respect community boundaries. The low clustering 
coefficient represents whether the node is a member of weakly tied communities and 
high clustering coefficient represents whether the node is a member of tightly tied 
communities. For instance, one triangle that passes through node N2 (N2-N3-N4) is 1, 
and the maximum number of triangles that could pass through b is 3 (a-b-c, a-b-d, b-c-
d), then 
 
 
 
In Figure 2, each node from S1 to S11 has the following clustering coefficient 
values. 
 
Node 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
CC 1 0.4 1 1 1 0.4 1 1 0.33 1 1 
 Table 1. Clustering coefficient of each node 
 
We need to note that the nodes with less than two neighbors are assumed to have 
a clustering coefficient of 0 or Not a Number (NaN). This research analyzes the 
clustering coefficients and characterizes the nodes that are not densely tied in its 
communities. 
3
1bC
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2.3.5 Betweenness centrality 
In graph theory, a betweenness centrality is a measure of a centrality of a vertex 
within a graph and quantifies the number of times a node acts as a bridge along the 
shortest path between two other nodes. In network analysis, it can measure the amount 
of connections of a node to the communities in a network flow [3]. High betweenness 
centrality represents the nodes that connected to many communities, which do not 
respect community boundaries [6]. For instance, I may access to many web pages and 
servers that belong to the University of Rhode Island because I am a student at the 
university. If my computer has tried to access the servers that belong to the Boston 
University, Brown University, Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, University of Connecticut,  and many other universities, my computer 
would be the bridge among the communities in each university when we present the 
relationships in a graph. In this case, many shortest paths will pass my computer, and 
it will increase the betweenness centrality.  
 
2.4 Trust 
Trust is an important but complex concept in social science, which represents a 
directional relationship between two parties that can be called trustor and trustee. It 
helps people to make assessments and decisions in unpredictable circumstances by 
reducing the uncertainty [66]. Trust is also a very important feature for network-based 
systems that have nodes, which need to interact with one other. In order to facilitate 
interactions in such system, trust must be addressed for the successful cooperation of 
nodes in systems such as the internet, wireless sensor networks, e-marketplaces, the 
26 
 
Grid, or peer-to-peer network systems. A trust management scheme manages 
reputations of each node in a system. The main purpose of a reputation system is to 
differentiate the states of the nodes in a system depending on each node’s behaviors. 
This section introduces trust management schemes and trust computation methods. 
 
2.4.1 Trust management schemes 
Michiardi et al. proposed Collaborative Reputation mechanism protocol (CORE) 
with the concept of reputation in order to evaluate each  node’s contribution to the 
network in [67]. CORE focused on detecting Denial of Service attacks in a wireless 
sensor network system by using subjective (observation), indirect (positive reports by 
others), and functional (task-specific behavior) reputations. These are formed and 
updated with time by direct observations and reported information from other nodes 
by weighted trust technique [68]. Buchegger, et al. [69], [70] have proposed 
“Cooperation Of Nodes, Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks” (CONFIDANT). 
By adopting Bayesian reputation [5] and trust system, it allows second-hand 
evaluations. CONFIDANT uses both direct observation of a node and the second-hand 
information from other nodes by weighted trust technique. This helps to evaluate a 
neighboring node, and the reputation is used to isolate the malicious nodes from its 
network [68]. DiPippo et al. proposed Secure Adaptive Routing Protocols (SARP) in  
[71]. SARP provides a multi-dimensional trust evaluation mechanism that can adapt to 
dynamic changes in the trust values of nodes in the network to route data from a data 
source to a base-station. The research used multiple behavioral evaluation methods 
and represented them by using a trust management scheme; forwarding trust, reporting 
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trust, availability trust, loop trust, and overall trust. The authors also presented that 
multiple evaluation results can be integrated into one, and they were able to efficiently 
find malicious nodes in the network by using the integrated trust. Chae et al. proposed 
REdeemable reputation based Secure Routing Protocol (RESRP) in [66] that extends 
the SARP to provide flexible and additional defense scheme against On-off attacks, 
which attempt to disturb trust management schemes by behaving well and badly 
alternatively [72], [73]. The authors proposed a new trust management scheme and 
successfully integrated with the previously proposed trust management scheme, which 
is SARP. 
As shown in these examples, trust management schemes are the tools that manage 
reputations of each node’s behaviors to find malicious nodes. The CORE [67] showed 
that the trust can be used for detecting network attacks, and the CONFIDANT [69], 
[70] showed how trust is able to use not only the direct observations but also indirect 
observations. The SARP [71] successfully integrated multiple trust values, and 
RESRP [68] showed that the trust management scheme can be easily extended. 
Moreover, trust management schemes can provide the solutions for the first and 
second problems that have been discussed in Section 2.2.3; the results of statistical 
analyses are not intuitive and difficult to integrate multiple analysis results into one. 
First, it can generate results between 0 (unreliable) and 1 (reliable), which can be 
understandable for the human supervisors without having the related statistical 
background. Second, the results generated by various statistical analyses can be 
integrated into one value because they will be converted in the same range. 
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2.4.2 Beta Reputation 
Bayesian framework relies on ratings, either positive or negative, and use 
probability distributions, such as the Beta distribution, to come up with reputation 
scores [5], [74]. The goal of a Bayesian framework is to predict the future behavior of 
a node whether it will be normal or malicious. By analyzing the probability that the 
expectation lies within an acceptable level of error, reputation can be determined. The 
framework has a parameter θ, which is calculated from the observations of the node’s 
prior behaviors, that represents the probability of the node will be normal or malicious 
on the next behavior. 
The beta reputation system [5] is based on statistical updating of beta probability 
density functions (PDF), which is based on the Bayesian framework. The current 
reputation score is computed by using the combination of the previous reputation 
score with the new behavior. The reputation score is represented in the form of the 
beta PDF parameter tuple (α, β), where α and β represent the fulfillment of positive 
and negative behaviors respectively. The beta distribution ݂ሺ݌|ߙ, ߚሻ can be expressed 
by using the gamma function Г as: 
 
݂ሺ݌|ߙ, ߚሻ ≔ Гሺߙ ൅ ߚሻГሺߙሻ ൅ Гሺߚሻ ݌
ఈିଵሺ1 െ ݌ሻఉିଵ (2)
 
, where 0 ൑ ݌ ൑ 1 and ߙ, ߚ ൐ 0 with the restriction that the probability variable ݌ ് 0 
if ܽ ൏ 1 , and ݌ ് 1  if ߚ ൏ 1  [75]. The probability expectation value of the beta 
distribution is given by  
 
29 
 
Eሺpሻ ≔ ߙߙ ൅ ߚ  (3)
 
, where the α and β represent the positive rating and negative rating respectively. The 
Beta reputation set the α as the rate of positive behaviors ܤ௣ plus 1 and β as the rate of 
observed negative behaviors ܤ௡ plus 1, where ܤ௣, ܤ௡ ൒ 0.  Hence, the trust value can 
be predicted by following equation. 
 
ܶ ≔ ܤ௣ ൅ 1ܤ௣ ൅ ܤ௡ ൅ 2 (4) 
 
2.4.3 Predictability Trust 
The beta reputation can have a behavior-based redemption feature. To understand 
the behavior-based redemption, assume that a friend had a bad behavior in the past, 
but since then the friend has behaved very well several times. Thus, we can expect that 
the friend will behave well in the next behavior [66]. Similarly, if a node behaves 
normal several times, we can expect the node will behave well in the next behavior 
even if the node showed a few malicious behaviors in the past. However, the behavior-
based redemption may not allow a node to regain the trust after being blocked by 
systems due to a few malicious behaviors because the method relies on subsequent 
behaviors. If the malicious behaviors have been caused by unintentional temporary 
errors or an attacker has used fake identifications, it might affect many normal users. 
Thus, it needs to be cautious before blocking nodes that showed a few malicious 
behaviors. Moreover, the behavior-based redemption can be disturbed by a smart 
attacker who wants to remain active in the system by disguising the malicious 
30 
 
behaviors as temporary errors. The attacker can disguise the malicious behaviors by 
being normal and malicious alternatively so that trust is always redeemed before 
another attack occurs. This type of attack is referred as an On-off attack [66]. This 
dissertation refers to a nN-mM On-off attack when a node performs n normal and m 
malicious behaviors alternatively. For instance, if a node showed 4 normal behaviors 
after 1 malicious behavior, it is a 4N- 1M On-off attack node. 
Chae et al. proposed Predictability trust (PRT) to provide defense against On-off 
attacks in [66], [68]. The authors developed Dynamic Sliding Windows (DSW) that 
change the size of the sliding windows depending on the current reputation. They used 
the DSWs for providing efficient and flexible trust management scheme and 
successfully detected and defended against On-off attacks. 
 
2.4.3.1. Predictability Trust Calculation 
The PRT is computed based on how well a node’s behavior meets expectations. 
This model is based on the probability distribution over the binary events, which are 
normal or malicious behaviors. For instance, if a node showed either higher out-degree 
than the system designer’s expectation or higher port-degree than the system 
designer’s expectation, the system will consider that the node showed a malicious 
behavior, which is hostscan attack or portscan attack respectively, and we set the event 
as Malicious Predictability Behavior (MPB). On the other hand, if the node behaved as 
the system designer expected, we set the event as Normal Predictability Behavior 
(NPB). The PRT counts the number of NPB and MPB, and computes the trust as in (5), 
using the formula of Beta reputation system in (4).  
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ܴܲܶ ≔ ܰܲܤ ൅ 1ܰܲܤ ൅ܯܲܤ ൅ 2 (5)
 
Chae et al. showed that a system designer might accept a certain level of damage 
risk to maintain the desired effectiveness of the system in [66]. When the system 
detects an On-off attack that causes little damage, for instance, 20N-1M On-off attack, 
it may be allowed being active in the system. The authors have proposed dynamic 
sliding window to achieve this goal.  
 
2.4.3.2. Sliding Windows 
Sliding Window (SW) is a tool for evaluating neighbor nodes, and the main 
purpose is to keep track of the past behaviors of a node. It would be the best practice if 
we could store and observe the entire behaviors of each node, but this is unattainable 
because a system has limited storage and processor speed. For these reasons, Chae et 
al. employed SW, which allows a certain number of behaviors to be stored, in [66], 
[68]. A SW updates and stores the latest behavior history by removing the oldest 
observation in its memory when there is a new observation. In the papers, they 
implemented two types of SW for the PRT: a fixed sliding window for normal 
behaviors (NBW) and a dynamic sliding window for malicious behaviors (MBW).  
The NBW and MBW keep track of both normal and malicious behaviors. Thus, the 
number of normal behaviors in a NBW and the number of malicious behaviors in 
MBW are affected by both normal behaviors and bad behaviors. When a new behavior 
is observed and stored, it pushes out the oldest behavior from both windows. 
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Therefore, this structure allows behavior based redemption, so even if a node had 
several malicious behaviors, but it is not blocked by the security system, the PRT of 
the node can be recovered after several normal behaviors. Besides, the NBW and MBW 
will keep the latest behaviors because the first feature discards the oldest behaviors 
from the windows. Thus, the system designer can manage the system as the fresh 
information. Last, this structure requires more number of malicious behaviors to detect 
a patterned attack than the Separated structure and Mixed structure. This allows the 
system to be more circumspect for discriminating malicious nodes. 
 
 Figure 4. Normal Behavior Window (NBW) 
 
a) Normal Behavior Window: The main purpose of the NBW is to observe the 
number of normal behaviors among the stored behaviors. A NBW stores both normal 
and malicious behaviors, but it counts only the number of normal behaviors. This 
makes it possible to consider only the fresh normal behaviors while keeping in mind 
the overall pattern of behaviors in the recent past. A system designer is able to provide 
a specific number of opportunities for malicious nodes by setting the size of NBW 
[66].  
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Figure 4 shows how the NBW works. The top part of the figure shows the initial 
status of a NBW with a size of five, and the NBW kept four normal behaviors and one 
malicious behavior. The bottom part of the figure shows the same window after four 
more behaviors. In this figure, the behavior history in the storage is represented by the 
white boxes, so it removes any behaviors in the shaded boxes. The boxes on the left of 
the “Current” arrow are the past behaviors that it stores in the storage. The box that 
the arrow points out is the latest behavior, and the boxes on the right side of the arrow 
represent space for future behaviors that have not occurred yet. In this example, the 
number of normal behaviors changed from four to three after four behaviors in 2N-1M 
attack [66].  
 
 
Figure 5. Changes of size in Malicious Behavior Window (MBW) depending on 
the current trust 
 
b) Malicious Behavior Window: The authors were more interested in the 
malicious behaviors than the normal behaviors because they are harmful to the system, 
and the primary purpose of PRT is to detect malicious nodes. However, to avoid 
erroneously labeling nodes as malicious, we need to be cautious in discriminating the 
malicious nodes. For these reasons, the authors developed a MBW that allows us to 
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observe more previous malicious behaviors depending on the current trust value. So as 
trust decreases the size of MBW increases as shown in Figure 5.  
A MBW stores normal and malicious behaviors but counts only the number of 
malicious behaviors. The size of the window changes dynamically as the trust of the 
node changes, and a system designer is able to set a maximum window size for the 
MBW. Chae et al. performed a set of analytical tests that indicate the tolerance to 
attack for a given maximum window size and discussed the analytical results in [68]. 
By referencing the analytical results, a system designer is able to determine how much 
damage the system can tolerate and set the MBW maximum size accordingly [66].  
 
ܵ݅ݖ݁ ≔ ݅ ൈ ܯ݅݊ܶݎݑݏݐ ൅ ݆ (6)
ܯܽݔܵ݅ݖ݁ ≔ ݅ ൈ ܯ݅݊ܶݎݑݏݐ ൅ ݆ (7)ܯ݅݊ܵ݅ݖ݁ ≔ ݅ ൈܯܽݔܶݎݑݏݐ ൅ ݆ 
 
While the system designer set the maximum and minimum MBW size, the 
dynamic size of the MBW is computed by (6), where 0.0 ൑ ܯ݅݊ܶݎݑݏݐ ൑
ܯܽݔܶݎݑݏݐ ൑ 1.0, and the i and j are computed using simultaneous equations (7). By 
adjusting the values of MaxTrust and MinTrust, the designer can affect the range of 
the size for the MBW [66]. 
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 Figure 6. Malicious Behavior Window (MBW) 
 
When a node observes a malicious behavior, the current trust gets lower. Since 
the MBW wants to observe more number of previous behaviors when the trust is low, 
it increases the size of the window. Figure 6 shows an example how the MBW works. 
When a malicious behavior was observed from a node, the current trust for the node 
gets lower. In Figure 6, we see on the top a window size of five with one malicious  
behavior. Thus, we want to observe more number of previous behaviors. Later, as 
presented in the window on the bottom of the figure, two more malicious behaviors 
have occurred. The MBW size has increased because the malicious behavior lowered 
the trust of the node so that we can count three malicious behaviors in the MBW while 
the NBW in Figure 4 allows us to count only two malicious behaviors. 
One of the advantages of the PRT is that the method is able to provide long-term 
observation-based second chances to each node and allow a certain level of risk in 
order to maintain the efficiency of the system [66], [68]. For instance, if an attacker 
hides/disguises the IP addresses of the attack nodes or composes attacks behind a 
device such as VPN or Proxy server as we discussed in Section 2.6.2, the system still 
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allow the other normal users could connect to the system by taking a certain amount of 
risks.  
However, the trust management schemes still require thresholds to evaluate a 
behavior whether it is normal or malicious. This dissertation uses an outlier method to 
provide adaptive thresholds for the trust management scheme. 
 
 
2.5 Outlier-based adaptive threshold 
Even though trust management schemes can provide a method to avoid 
erroneously labeling nodes with a few malicious behaviors, the methods still have an 
issue that the evaluation method depends on thresholds. It is not easy to set an 
appropriate threshold in a dynamic environment, such as the Internet because if a 
threshold is too high, malicious nodes cannot be detected while a low threshold has a 
possibility that normal nodes would be classified as malicious. One of the proposed 
ways to solve this issue is adaptive threshold method. 
Adaptive threshold method was proposed in [76] and is also known as time-
varying threshold method. The method adjusts its thresholds depending on the recently 
collected data sets. An outlier is something that does not belong to any existing group 
or class. The method computes outlier factor of every point in the dataset based on the 
nearest neighborhood it has [77]. Many researchers have proposed ADSs based on the 
outlier detection methods [78]–[80]. 
An outlier can be defined as an observation point that is distant from other 
observations [81], [82], and it may indicate a systematic error, faulty data, or 
37 
 
erroneous procedures. Since outliers occur in low probability region, this research 
considered them as anomalous and malicious behaviors. 
 
 Figure 7. Log scaled host-degree distribution for one day of data 
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 Figure 8. Log scaled port-degree distribution for one day of data 
 
 Figure 9. Log scaled betweenness centrality distribution for one day of data 
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Figure 7, 8, and 9 show the distribution of host-degree, port-degree, and 
betweenness centrality for one day of the European dataset (Section 1.3) respectively, 
and they showed heavy-tailed distributions. A heavy-tailed distribution has heavier 
tails than the exponential distribution, and it is common within computer systems from 
degree distributions in the internet and social networks to file sizes and interarrival 
times of workloads [83]. The right tail of the distribution is of interest because it is the 
low probability region that malicious data instances occur (Section 2.2). For instance, 
the maximum host-degree was 6,455 in the European dataset, and it represents that the 
node attempted to access to 6,455 different IP addresses in a day. As shown in the 
following simple equation, 6455 ሺ24 ൈ 60ሻ ൎ 4.5⁄ , the node attempted to access 
average 4.5 different IP addresses every minute, and the behaviors of the node cannot 
be considered as normal. Besides, the maximum port-degree was 14,186 in the 
European dataset, and this also represents the node attempted to access to average 9.85 
different ports every minute by the following simple equation, 
14186 ሺ24 ൈ 60ሻ ൎ 9.85⁄ .  
Schluter et al. [4] proposed a method that identifies multiple outliers in heavy-
tailed distributions, and we employed this method to implement the adaptive threshold 
for the trust management scheme. The authors treated the problem of multiple outlier 
detections in heavy-tailed distribution through outward testing using the k most 
extreme order statistics. In other words, if we consider a sample of size n and the 
associated order list is ଵܺ,௡ ൒ ܺଶ,௡ ൒ ⋯ ൒ ܺ௞,௡ ൒ ⋯ ൒ ܺ௡,௡, the method finds the k 
extreme order statistics that might not belong to the population of interest.  
40 
 
A sequence of null hypotheses was indexed by κ and noted as ܪ଴,௞, where k = 1, 
2, … and the ݇௧௛ order statistic ܺ௞,௡ belongs to the population of interest. The dataset 
is tested sequence of null hypotheses ܪ଴,௞, ܪ଴,௞ିଵ, … , ܪ଴,ଵ . The outlier point k was 
specified if Ri, ri exceeds the critical level δ-1/α, where δ is the size of tests.  
The Ri is a ratio of order statistics, and the authors compared this statistical results 
because the ratios converge for heavy-tailed distributions extreme spacings diverse 
and are dependent [4].  
 
ܴ௜ ≔ ௜ܺ,௡௜ܺାଵ,௡ (8) 
 
,and the ri is the individual critical level for the overall test to have size δ.  
 
ݎ௜ ≔ ൣ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߜሻଵ/௞൧ିଵ/ሺఈ௜ሻ (9) 
 
, where the α is the nuisance parameter. The α is estimated by the Hill estimator [84]. 
However, the original Hill estimator requires a specific number of extremes to be 
included for estimation. Thus, Schluter et al. [4] modified the Hill estimator. 
 
ߙି௞ෞ ሺߢሻ ≔ ൥ ݇ െ 1ߢ െ ሺ݇ െ 1ሻ ݈݊ܺ௞ െ
ߢ െ 1
ߢ െ ሺ݇ െ 1ሻ ݈݊ܺ఑ ൅
1
ߢ െ ሺ݇ െ 1ሻ෍݈݊ ௜ܺ
఑
௜ୀ௞
൩
ିଵ
 (10)
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,where the κ is the number of extremes. The authors noted that there are more 
sophisticated methods to robustly estimate the tail parameter, but the tail index is just a 
nuisance parameter for this method [4]. Therefore, they referred  (10) as an estimator. 
If Ri and ri of ܪ଴,୩ do not exceed the critical level δ-1/α, the next null hypothesis 
ܪ଴,௞ିଵ will be tested with ܴ୩ିଵ. The test will be continued until the first outlier is 
detected or the sample maximum has been tested.  
We note that the outlier-based adaptive threshold method cannot be applied to the 
clustering coefficient because the clustering coefficient does not show the heavy-tailed 
distribution as shown in Figure 10. Thus, we decided to set a static threshold only for 
the clustering coefficient analyses. The static threshold has been decided based on a 
statistical analysis that can maximize the efficiency of the detection. The detailed 
statistical analysis is presented in Section 4.3. Also, the zero clustering coefficient 
values were excluded from the analysis because it represents there was not enough 
connections to evaluate the node with the clustering coefficient (Section 2.3.4). 
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Figure 10. Distribution of clustering coefficients 
The outlier point of a dataset will be used to set our adaptive threshold method for 
the trust management scheme. The outlier point will be a threshold that classifies 
malicious behaviors, and the statistical results of the rest of the behaviors will be used 
for another threshold that classifies normal behaviors. The detailed usage will be 
described in Section 3.2. 
 
2.6 Intrusion overview 
An intrusion to computer and computer network is any unauthorized activity that 
attempts to compromise the integrity, confidentiality or availability on a computer or a 
computer network. The system intrusions may cause the following dangers. First, 
personal data can be stolen. In [16], the authors warned that the digital personal data 
loss is more dangerous threats to people than physical personal data loss because 
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people can know the physical data loss and can take precautions, but in digital loss, 
people may even never know that their data was stolen. Second, privacy can be 
compromised. In these days the information about an individual is stored online, such 
as credit and debit cards, personal address, phone numbers, etc. Once the systems that 
store the information is compromised, the privacy of those individuals is compromised 
as well. Last, the compromised systems can be a part of cybercrime. A cracker who 
breaks into your system might use the system for the purpose of cybercrime. 
In order to detect intrusions, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of how 
attacks work. This section presents an introduction to potential intrusions to computer 
and computer networks. Among the various attacks, this research focuses on the 
Hostscan and Portscan attacks, which can be easily detected by the statistical analysis-
based IDS. 
 
2.6.1 Scanning attacks 
This research considers the hostscan and portscan attacks because they are 
relatively easy to detect by using the statistical analysis-based IDS. Scanning is a 
technique for discovering available target nodes and the target nodes’ open ports. By 
sending port probes, which are disguised as client requests, to a range of target IP and 
port addresses. Although sometimes system administrators use this technique to verify 
security policies of their network systems, the technique is used by attackers to 
identify running services on a target node with the aim of exploiting a known 
vulnerability of that service.  
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Choi et al. defined nine graphical signatures, which are the Portscan, Hostscan, 
Worm, Source-spoofed DoS (port fixed), Backscatter, Source-spoofed DoS (port 
varied), Distributed hostscan, Network-directed DoS, and Single-source DoS, in [37]. 
 
2.6.1.1. Hostscan  
 
Figure 11. Hostscan [37] 
 
An Internet Protocol address (IP address) is a numerical label assigned to each 
device and identifies each device in a network for communication. An attacker or a 
worm virus may scan multiple IP addresses to find victim machines, which provide a 
known vulnerable service. Hostscan is a technique for discovering available target 
nodes and the target nodes’ open ports. As shown in Figure 11, the attacker sends port 
probes, which are disguised as client requests, to the same port on a range of target IP 
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addresses, the attacker is aware of a particular vulnerability and tries to find 
susceptible machines. The most common are SYN scans and ACK scans but other 
TCP flags combinations can be used [85]. This dissertation assumes that the hostscan 
nodes will show high out-degrees and low port-degrees.  
 
2.6.1.2. Portscan  
 
Figure 12. Portscan [37] 
 
Network ports are the entry points to a machine that is connected to the Internet. 
Through a port, a service is able to communicate with a client application, process 
requests and send responses back. An attacker may sometimes exploit vulnerabilities 
in the server code so the attacker can obtain access to sensitive data or execute 
malicious code on the server remotely. Portscan is a technique for discovering 
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available target nodes’ available ports. As shown in Figure 12, this probes several 
destination ports on a single target node. If the attacker naively scans a target node, it 
is easy to detect because even the target node can detect the attack without any support 
from other machines. This scan frequently carried out via UDP [85]. This dissertation 
assumes that the portscan nodes will show low host-degrees and high port-degrees.  
 
2.6.1.3. Hybrid-scan 
 
Figure 13. Hybrid Scan 
 
Hybrid scan is a technique that probes several destination ports on several target 
nodes. In [86], the authors described that this method can yield a hit-list, which is a 
collection of potentially vulnerable target nodes, for future exploitation. This 
dissertation assumes that the hybrid-scan nodes will show high host-degrees and high 
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port-degrees. In other words, the node will show low degree trust and low port degree 
trust. 
Since these types of attacks attempt the relatively large number of connections 
[37] or do not respect the community boundaries [6], this research will detect the 
attacks by using flow-based analysis and graph-based methods as we discussed in 
Section 2.2.2.  
 
2.6.2 Deception of identity 
The flow-based analysis method inherits the disadvantages of the ADS. An 
attacker may disturb the method and increase the false positive rate (Section 2.1.2) by 
forging the identity. When a system connects to the Internet, the Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) assigns an IP address to the system. The system’s activity can be 
tracked with the IP address, and the IP address can specify the location of the system 
and track the Internet activities. The sophisticated hackers know about hiding their 
tracks. This makes it difficult for systems to decide which IP addresses should be 
blocked because it could affect many normal users.  
There exist many methods that can hide the IP address [87]–[89]. First, Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) provider can assign a new IP address to the system, and every 
traffic from the system routes through the VPN network. This makes it possible to 
hide the true IP address assigned by the ISP. Second, there are thousands of free web 
proxy servers that the system can use to hide the true IP address and connects the 
Internet anonymously by connecting the network through an intermediate “proxy”, 
which relays the information back and forth between the system and the destination. 
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When the VPN or the proxy server was blocked by the secure system, the other users 
who connect the system through the VPN or the proxy server would be blocked 
together no matter they were normal users or not. Thus, the secure systems need to be 
cautious before blocking the suspicious IP addresses. 
 
2.7 Summary 
We provided the background and related scholar research work in this chapter. 
Section 2.1 reviewed the types of IDS and presented the advantages and disadvantages 
of ADS. Section 2.2 discussed the Statistical analysis-based ADS with the advantages 
of the flow-based statistical analysis. The related graph theory for the flow-based 
statistical analysis was presented in Section 2.3 and discussed how the theory can 
characterize each network node’s behaviors. Section 2.4 provided the contextual 
literature review of the trust management scheme that was used for representing the 
results of each statistical analysis method, and Section 2.5 gave a background research 
for an adaptive threshold. Section 2.6 presented the attacks that this dissertation aims 
to detect with the statistical analysis-based ADS. Chapter 3 will present an ADS 
(Section 2.1) that can detect network attacks (Section 2.6) with the flow-based 
statistical analysis (Section 2.2) by characterizing each node’s behaviors (Section 2.3) 
and representing the results with a trust management scheme (Section 2.4) in a 
dynamic environment (Section 2.5).  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
STATISTICAL NETWORK ANALYSIS BY USING TRUST 
 
This dissertation proposes a statistical network analysis method by using trust to 
implement an effective IDS, especially an effective ADS. First of all, we reduced the 
amount of dataset to be analyzed by representing the relationships between nodes with 
graphs as we discussed in Section 2.3. Graph has been used by many research 
proposals to implement relationship-based ADS [6], [37], [56], [59], [62], [63]. In 
particular, Choi et al. [37] detected malicious behaviors by using parallel coordinate 
graphs with degree analysis, and Ding et al. [6] showed that the nodes, which do not 
respect community’s boundaries, can be classified as malicious nodes. However, it is 
hard to understand the produced results of the statistical analyses in the two research 
proposals without statistical background because each result has different meaning 
depending on the analysis method. For the same reason, the results cannot be 
integrated into one value. Moreover, a certain threshold is required for each analysis to 
detect malicious behaviors, but it is difficult to decide an appropriate value in a 
dynamic environment, such as the Internet, because a high threshold cannot detect 
malicious nodes while a low threshold has a possibility that normal nodes would be 
classified as malicious as we discussed in Section 2.5.  
This chapter proposes an analysis method to achieve the goals of this dissertation 
in Section 1.2. Section 3.1 discusses how we can characterize each node with 
statistical analyses, and Section 3.2 proposes a method that represents the produced 
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results using a trust management scheme. Section 3.3 presents how the Predictability 
Trust (PRT) integrates multiple statistical analyses, and Section 3.4 shows how the 
produced trust values can be integrated into one. Finally, Section 3.5 summarizes 
Chapter 3.  
 
3.1 Node characterization 
The parallel coordinates analysis method [37] showed that each scanning attack 
has its own behavior signature as we discussed in Section 2.4. A hostscan attack node 
shows high host-degree and low port-degree, a portscan attack node shows low host-
degree and high port-degree, and a hybrid-scan attack node shows high host-degree 
and high port-degree. Therefore, we can characterize each node’s behaviors by 
analyzing the degree information whether it is a scanning attack node or not. 
Moreover, the clustering coefficient and betweenness centrality can be used for 
characterizing the nodes that do not respect the community’s boundaries as shown in 
[6]. Thus, this dissertation utilizes the host-degree, port-degree, clustering coefficient, 
and betweenness centrality for characterizing each node’s behaviors from bipartite and 
projection graphs. 
There exist two issues we need to address to utilize the four factors. First, [37] 
detected malicious nodes based on the high degree information, and [6] showed that 
malicious nodes tend to show low clustering coefficient or high betweenness centrality 
information. However, it is not clear that how big degree and betweenness centrality is 
malicious and how small it is normal. It is also not clear how small clustering 
coefficient is malicious and how big it is normal. Moreover, the Internet is a dynamic 
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environment that changes every day, every hour, and every minute. Thus, we needed 
to create an appropriate rule for detecting the malicious behaviors by considering the 
overall behavior conditions. To solve this issue, we applied the outlier-based adaptive 
threshold method to the degree and betweenness centrality information to detect 
malicious behaviors that occur in low probability regions. We note that the outlier-
based adaptive threshold method cannot be applied to the clustering coefficient 
information because it does not show the heavy-tailed distribution as shown in Figure 
14. 
 
 Figure 14. Clustering coefficient distribution for one day of data 
 
Second, the degree, clustering coefficient, and betweenness centrality are 
represented by simple numbers, and it is not intuitive what the numbers mean without 
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the related statistical background. Besides, each information has different ranges of 
numbers. For instance, the host-degree showed the range from 1 to 6,455, port-degree 
showed the range from 1 to 14,186, clustering coefficient showed the range from 0 to 
1, and the betweenness centrality showed the range from 0 to 109,171,143.80161 in 
the European dataset. Thus, it is not possible to integrate the information into one 
value. We present a trust management scheme as a solution to deal with these two 
issues. 
 
3.2 Modified Beta Reputation 
Beta reputation was proposed by Jøsang et al. in [5], and we discussed this 
technique in Section 2.4.2. The proposed Beta reputation predicts the future behaviors 
of each node based on the past behaviors. We employed the Beta reputation; 1) to rate 
each different ranges of behavior information between 0 (unreliable) and 1 (reliable), 
2) to provide a simple calculation method, 3) to provide accumulative evaluation 
method, so reduce the amount of data to be analyzed, 4) to avoid erroneously labeling 
nodes with a few malicious behaviors, and 5) to integrate multiple behavior 
information into one. 
In our Modified Beta Reputation method, we defined two thresholds to establish 
appropriate standards for normal and malicious behavior. We define a Maximum 
Threshold (MaxTh) as a certain value that identifies outliers. The Minimum Threshold 
(MinTh) is defined as an average of the observed values except for the outliers. 
Since the Beta reputation relies on a certain threshold to decide whether a 
behavior met the expectation of a system or not (Section 2.4.2), we employed the 
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adaptive threshold in Section 2.5 to deal with a dynamic environment, and the 
threshold is called as MaxTh in this dissertation. At the same time, we set another 
adaptive threshold to detect normal behaviors, which occur in high probability regions, 
because the range of the collected information can be huge as shown in Section 3.1.  
The average is the most popular and well-known measure of central tendency, 
which is a single value that attempts to describe a set of data by identifying the central 
position within that set of data [90]. However, the average has one main disadvantage: 
it is particularly susceptible to the influence of outliers [90]. Since we computed the 
outliers by using the adaptive threshold, we could overcome the disadvantage. Thus, 
this research used the average of the behaviors except for the outliers, and the 
threshold is called as MinTh in this dissertation.  
We modified the trust management scheme to utilize the two adaptive thresholds 
because the beta reputation uses only one threshold. Besides, the modified beta 
reputation can show how the behavior, which is placed between the MinTh and 
MaxTh, is closed to the normal behavior or malicious behavior. 
 
ܰܤܴ௜ ≔
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ
 
1 , ܤܸ ൑ ܯ݄݅݊ܶ 
0 , ܤܸ ൒ ܯܽݔ݄ܶ 
1 െ ܤ ௜ܸ െ ܯ݄݅݊ܶܯܽݔ݄ܶ െܯ݄݅݊ܶ , ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ 
 
(11)
 
ܯܤܴ௜ ≔
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ
 
1 , ܤܸ ൒ ܯܽݔ݄ܶ 
0 , ܤܸ ൑ ܯ݄݅݊ܶ 
ܤ ௜ܸ െ ܯ݄݅݊ܶ
ܯܽݔ݄ܶ െܯ݄݅݊ܶ , ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ 
 
(12)
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ܰܰܤ௜ ≔ ܰܰܤ௜ ൅ ܰܤܴ௜ 
ܰܯܤ௜ ≔ ܰܯܤ௜ ൅ܯܤܴ௜ 
(13)
 
 
௜ܶ ≔ ܰܰܤ௜ ൅ 1ܰܰܤ௜ ൅ ܰܯܤ௜ ൅ 2 
(14)
 
,where each symbol represents the minimum threshold of the dataset (MinTh), the 
maximum threshold of the dataset (MaxTh), Behavior Value of node i  (ܤ ௜ܸ),  Normal 
Behavior Rate of node i (ܰܤܴ௜), Malicious Behavior Rate of node i (ܯܤܴ௜), Number 
of Normal Behaviors of node i (ܰܰܤ௜), Number of Malicious Behaviors of node i 
(ܰܯܤ௜), and Trust of node i ( ௜ܶ) respectively. The ܤ ௜ܸ  includes host-degree, port-
degree, clustering coefficient, and betweenness centrality of node i that we discussed 
in Section 2.3.2, 2.3.4, and 2.3.5, and we the calculated trust values to characterize 
each node’s behaviors.  
The outlier-based adaptive threshold technique (Section 2.5) was used for setting 
the MaxTh values in (11) and (12), which decides whether the ܤ ௜ܸ  was normal or 
malicious.  As we discussed in Section 2.5, the order of tests is from the maximum 
value to the minimum value. This was applied to the host-degree, port-degree, and 
betweenness centrality evaluations because the high value is worse than the low value 
of each ܤ ௜ܸ. Thus, the 1,nX  is the maximum value and ,n nX  is the minimum value in 
the dataset of the BVs. The MinTh can be decided after removing the outliers from the 
dataset.  
By using the MinTh and MaxTh values, we can set the ܰܤܴ௜ and ܯܤܴ௜. When 
ܤ ௜ܸ is greater than the MaxTh, the ܰܤܴ௜ will be set to 0, and the ܯܤܴ௜ will be set to 
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1. On the contrary, if ܤ ௜ܸ is smaller than the MinTh value, the ܰܤܴ௜will be set to 1, 
and the ܯܤܴ௜will be set to 0. The equation ሺܤܸ െܯ݄݅݊ܶሻ ሺܯܽݔ݄ܶ െܯ݄݅݊ܶሻ⁄  in 
(11) and (12) rates how close the ܤ ௜ܸ to the MinTh and MaxTh values. For instance, if 
we set the MinTh to 5, MaxTh to 10, and BV to 6, the NBR and MBR of the node will 
be 
 
ܰܤܴ௜ ≔ 1 െ ܤ ௜ܸ െ ܯ݄݅݊ܶܯܽݔ݄ܶ െܯ݄݅݊ܶ ൌ 1 െ
6 െ 5
10 െ 5 ൌ ૙. ૡ 
ܯܤܴ௜ ≔ ܤ ௜ܸ െ ܯ݄݅݊ܶܯܽݔ݄ܶ െܯ݄݅݊ܶ ൌ
6 െ 5
10 െ 5 ൌ ૙. ૛ 										 
 
Besides, this method made it possible that the inactivity of a node would not 
affect the trust changes. Since the both NBR and MBR of the node would be 0s, the 
both NBB and MBB will keep the same value. 
As we note in Section 2.5, we did not apply the outlier-based adaptive threshold 
method to the clustering coefficient because the clustering coefficient does not show 
the heavy-tailed distribution as shown in Figure 10. Thus, we decided to set a static 
threshold only for the clustering coefficient analyses. The static threshold will be 
decided by comparing the detection efficiency of each threshold from 0 to 1 in the 
European dataset and DShield list (Section 1.3), and the detailed statistical analysis 
result is presented in Section 4.3.3.  
The calculated ܰܤܴ௜  and ܯܤܴ௜  are accumulated over time to the ܰܰܤ௜  and 
ܰܯܤ௜ respectively by (13). The modified Beta reputation equation (14) computes the 
trust value for each node by using the accumulated behaviors, which are the ܰܰܤ௜ and 
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ܰܯܤ௜. This research maintains the ܰܰܤ௜, ܰܯܤ௜, and trust values for each type of 
behaviors; host-degree (ܪܦ ௜ܶ), port-degree (ܲܦ ௜ܶ), clustering coefficient (ܥܥ ௜ܶ), and 
betweenness centrality (ܤܥ ௜ܶ).  
By employing the modified Beta reputation, we can convert the different ranges 
of node characterization information between 0 and 1 that represent unreliable and 
reliable respectively. Besides, the method provides a low time complexity. The 
outlier-based adaptive threshold requires Oሺ݊	log ݊ሻ  for a sorting algorithm (i.e. 
Merge Sort) [91] and Oሺ݊ሻ for the evaluation from the highest value to the lowest 
value that we discussed in Section 2.5, where the n represents the number of unique 
values. Also, the average-based adaptive threshold requires Oሺ݉ሻ for the addition of 
all the values with one division, and the Beta Reputation requires Oሺ݉ሻ  for the 
thresholds comparisons with the trust calculations that was discussed in this section, 
where the m represents the number of nodes. Thus, the total complexity of the 
modified Beta reputation is Oሺ݊	log ݊ሻ ൅ Oሺ݉ሻ. The accumulative evaluation feature 
also saves the storage because this method requires the space complexity Oሺ݉ሻ for 
each trust type. Moreover, it provides a method to avoid erroneously labeling nodes 
with a few malicious behaviors because only one malicious behavior does not lower 
the trust value at once, and the successive normal behaviors can recover the trust. 
Since the different rages of the node characterization information were converted into 
a same range, it is also possible to integrate multiple characteristics into a single value, 
so the integrated trust can efficiently find malicious nodes that attempt different types 
of attacks alternatively as we discussed in Section 2.4.1. 
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3.3 Predictability Trust 
In addition to the types of trust in Section 3.2, this research employed 
Predictability Trust (PRT) for ADS systems to evaluate a node with multiple statistical 
characteristics and to provide defense against On-off attacks. First of all, an attack 
node might attempt different attacks each day, so it would be difficult to detect the 
attack node if each trust value works independently. The PRT is not only able to 
consider a single type of behaviors but also a combination of multiple types depending 
on the design of systems. In this dissertation, the PRT examined the host-degree, port-
degree, clustering coefficient, and betweenness centrality together to detect any type 
of alternative hostscan, portscan, hybrid-scan, or any types of attacks that do not 
respect the community’s boundaries. We also note that this research employed two 
kinds of threshold as we discussed in Section 3.2, and we cannot be sure whether a 
node is normal or malicious if the behavior is greater than the MinTh and smaller than 
the MaxTh while it is clear the node is normal if the behavior is smaller than the 
MinTh, and the node is malicious if the behavior is greater than then MaxTh. Thus, we 
decided not to consider the unclear behaviors for the PRT, and they will not affect to 
either the NPB or MPB. 
 
ܴܲܶ ≔ ܰܲܤ ൅ 1ܰܲܤ ൅ܯܲܤ ൅ 2 (15)
 
The PRT will be computed by (5), and the NPB and MPB will be set by the 
following conditions. The pseudocode is shown in APPENDIX I.A.  
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 If all the behaviors placed between the MaxTh and MinTh, neither the NPB nor 
MPB will be increased. 
 If any one of the behaviors exceeded the MaxTh, the MPB will be increased, 
but not NPB. 
 If any one of the behaviors did not exceed the MinTh, and the other behaviors 
did not exceed the MaxTh, the NPB will be increased, but not MPB. 
 
Secondly, as we discussed in Section 2.4.3, the PRT provides a cautious 
evaluation method that determines whether the behaviors of a node are unintentional 
temporary errors or a part of On-off attacks. The PRT with Sliding windows (SW) is a 
method that detects On-off attacks, which aim at disturbing trust management schemes 
[66], [68]. As shown in the following examples, the Beta reputation, as well as the 
modified Beta reputation, can be easily disturbed by an On-off attack. We evaluated 
the Beta reputation with  four different types of behavior patterns shown in Table 2. 
Each T and F represent a normal and malicious behavior respectively.  
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 … 50
(a) 1 Time Error F T T T T T T T T T T T … T 
(b) Close-set F F F F F F F F F F T T … T 
(c) Evenly Distributed T T T T F T T T T F T T … F 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
T T T T T T T T T T T T T T F T F 
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
T F T  T F T T T T T T T F T T T T 
35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50  
F T T T F F T T T F F T T T T T  
(d) Random 
Table 2. The patterns of on-off attacks 
 
The behavior type (a) assumes that a node showed a temporary error, and the 
node can be classified as malicious with the only mistake as we discussed in Section 
2.6.2. It may increase the false positive rate of an ADS, and our trust management 
scheme can avoid this situation. The behavior type (b), (c), and (d) are the possible 
4G-1B On-off attack patterns, and (c) and (d) were designed to recover the trust 
enough and attempt other attacks on the system. The Beta reputation can be disturbed 
by these types of behavior patterns due to the behavior-based redemption feature 
(Section 2.4). Moreover, some random behavior patterns, such a pattern shown in 
Table 2.(d), can also disturb the Beta reputation method. 
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Figure 15 shows the changes of the Beta reputation values depending on the 
behavior patterns in Table 2. The X-axis and Y-axis represent the behavior number 
and the corresponding trust value respectively. The Beta reputation recovered the trust 
value in the one-time error type due to the behavior-based redemption feature and the 
successive normal behaviors as shown in Figure 15.(a), and it showed that a node with 
  
(a) One-time error (b)  Close-set attacks 
  
(c)  Evenly distributed On-off attacks (d)  Random On-off attacks 
Figure 15. The changes of the Beta reputation depending on the behavior 
patterns 
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one mistake does not have very low trust value as expect. On the other hand, close-set 
attack type showed a very low trust value after the 10 malicious behaviors as shown in 
Figure 15.(b), and it might be blocked if the system has a trust threshold 0.3. On the 
other hand, Figure 15.(c) and (d) maintained high trust value, even they showed the 
same number of malicious behaviors to the close-set type, and these cases showed the 
vulnerability of the Beta reputation. The two pattern types could disturb the Beta 
reputation with well distributed normal and malicious behaviors. 
Calculating the PTR, (5) also requires the sizes for the Normal Behavior Window 
(NBW) and Malicious Behavior Window (MBW). To show how the PRT provides a 
defense against On-off attacks in Table 2, we set the size of the NBW to 5 that can 
observe up to five previous behaviors, and the MBW has two sizes; the minimum size 
was set to 5, and the maximum size was set to 50. These NBW and MBW combination 
can detect up to 4N-1M On-off attacks [68].  
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The PRT showed similar results to the Beta reputation in Figure 16.(a) and (b). In 
Figure 16.(a), it recovered the trust value for the one-time error type but slower than 
the Beta reputation due to the one malicious behavior. The figure also showed that the 
one malicious behavior does not much lower the trust value. Figure 16.(b) showed that 
the many successive malicious behaviors lowers the trust similar to the Beta 
  
(a) One-time error (b)  Close-set attacks 
  
(c)  Evenly distributed On-off attacks (d)  Random On-off attacks 
Figure 16. The changes of the PRT depending on the behavior patterns 
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reputation. On the other hand, the PRT showed different changes for the evenly 
distributed and random On-off attacks., and they showed how the PRT provided 
defense against On-off attacks. The Beta reputation was disturbed by the alternative 
normal-malicious behaviors while the PRT could successfully lower the trust values of 
the On-off attack patterns as shown in Figure 16.(c) and (d). Since the PRT extends the 
size of the dynamic sliding window depending on the current trust, it was able to 
observe more number of malicious behaviors and lowered the trust values.  
By employing the PRT, we were able to consider multiple node characterization 
information together and provide defense against On-off attacks with low time and 
space complexity. The PRT requires Oሺܯ ൈ ܰሻ for traveling the maximum sliding 
window size M of N nodes, and Oሺܰሻ for the trust calculation. Thus, the total time 
complexity of the PRT is Oሺܯ ൈ ܰሻ. Besides, the sliding windows can save more 
space if they were implemented in bit-wise operation because the PRT considers only 
normal (TRUE) or malicious (FALSE). Thus, each sliding window for each node 
requires ܯ 8⁄ , and the space complexity of the PRT is Oሺܯ ൈ ܰሻ. 
 
3.4 Overall trust 
We defined the Overall Trust (OT) value as a compilation of all of the other trust 
values to evaluate if a node is malicious or not. The OT provides concise information 
to a system or a human supervisor by considering overall characteristics of each node 
and makes it possible to take appropriate actions based on the information. This 
dissertation used the OT to integrate multiple trust values, including the ܪܦ ௜ܶ, ܲܦ ௜ܶ, 
ܥܥ ௜ܶ, ܤܥ ௜ܶ, and ܴܲ ௜ܶ, into one. There exist many other ways that can implement this 
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type of trust. For example, Chae et al. proposed an OT that each trust has own weight 
that can contribute to the OT in [68]. 
 
1
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Overall Trust
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 (16)
 
,where the ௜ܶ represents a type of Trust, and the ௜ܹ represents the weight of the Trust 
in the Overall Trust. Other than this method, the average of the trust values, maximum 
trust value, or minimum trust value can be used for implementing the OT. Among the 
various methods, we decided to use the minimum trust value in this research to 
quickly detect the malicious node. 
 
3.5 Summary 
Chapter 3 proposed a statistical analysis-based ADS. However, the results of the 
statistical analysis are not intuitive and require statistical background to understand the 
numbers. Moreover, it is not possible to integrate multiple behavior information into 
one because each analysis method produces different ranges of numbers (Section 3.1). 
This dissertation proposed a trust management scheme as a solution that can convert 
each characteristic between 0 (unreliable) and 1 (reliable), so a human supervisor can 
understand the results without the related statistical background. The Beta reputation 
(Section 2.4.2) was modified for creating appropriate rules for decision-making about 
network node behaviors in a dynamic network environment by using an adaptive 
threshold (Section 2.5), and the modified Beta reputation was proposed in Section 3.2. 
65 
 
Besides, the trust makes it possible to integrate multiple behavior information into one 
because they will be presented in the same ranges. We used two methods to integrate 
the trust values. The Predictability trust was used for detecting malicious behavior 
patterns across the characteristics (Section 3.3), and the Overall trust represents 
multiple trust values in one single number (Section 3.4). In next chapter, we will show 
how much the graph can reduce the network flows, how well the trust management 
scheme represents the statistical analysis, and how well the proposed ADS detects 
malicious behaviors. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Chapter 4 evaluates the efficiency of the proposed graph-based representation, 
trust management scheme, and adaptive threshold methods, and how the methods 
achieved the goals stated in Chapter 1 by using the European dataset, DShield Logs, 
and URI dataset. Section 4.1 shows how much the graph-based representation reduced 
the datasets to be statistically analyzed. Section 4.2 describes how the trust 
management can represent the results of the statistical analysis appropriately, and 
Section 4.3 shows the effectiveness of the adaptive threshold by comparing a few 
static thresholds. This dissertation presents the detection results of the scanning attacks 
in the European dataset and URI datasets by using the proposed methods in Section 
4.4. Section 4.5 shows how the trust management scheme works in a few special 
cases. Finally, Section 4.5 summarizes this chapter. 
 
4.1 Graph-based representation of network flows 
This section shows the amount of data that can be reduced by using graph-based 
presentation. As discussed in Section 3.2, one of the advantages of using graph-based 
analysis is that the proposed methods can reduce the amount of dataset to be analyzed 
because many duplicate relationships between two nodes can be presented as one edge 
in a graph (Section 2.2.2).  
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For instance, 
Source node Destination node 
… … 
1.1.1.1 1.1.1.2 
1.1.1.1 1.1.1.3 
1.1.1.1 1.1.1.3 
1.1.1.1 1.1.1.3 
1.1.1.1 1.1.1.4 
… … 
 
can be reduced by the graph presentation like the following. 
 
Source node Destination node 
… … 
1.1.1.1 1.1.1.2 
1.1.1.1 1.1.1.3 
1.1.1.1 1.1.1.4 
… … 
 
In a large dataset, this method can reduce a huge amount of data by removing 
duplicate relationships and can save the processing and storage resources required for 
statistical analysis. Since this dissertation mainly focuses on detecting three types of 
scanning attacks (Section 2.6.1) and the nodes that do not respect community 
boundaries (Section 2.3.4, 2.4.4, and 2.4.5), we used the parts of network flows that 
are not compressed, encrypted, or fragmented, namely the IP address and port 
numbers. The following figures show how much the graph representation can reduce 
the datasets.  
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 Figure 17. Comparisons of the amount of IP addresses to be analyzed between 
the original and graph represented in the European dataset 
 
 Figure 18. Comparisons of the amount of ports to be analyzed between the 
original and graph represented in the European dataset 
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 Figure 19. Comparisons of the amount of IP addresses to be analyzed between 
the original and graph represented in the URI dataset 
 
 Figure 20. Comparisons of the amount of ports to be analyzed between the 
original and graph represented in the URI dataset 
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Figure 17 and Figure 18 show the amount of reduced data to be analyzed when 
the graph representation is applied to the European dataset. By using graphs the 
original network flow datasets were reduced by at least 81.1% and up to 86.9% for the 
IP address (Figure 17) and at least 77.9% and up to 80.8% for the ports (Figure 18). 
The detailed comparisons are described in APPENDIX II.A. Additionally. Figure 19 
and Figure 20 show the amount of reduced data to be analyzed for the URI dataset. 
We could reduce the original URI network flow dataset by at least 31.1% and up to 
54.3% for the IP addresses and at least 63.6% and up to 85.3% for the port. The 
detailed numbers are described in APPENDIX II.B. 
 
4.2 Relationship between statistical analysis and trust management scheme 
Since malicious behaviors could have been caused by unintentional temporary 
errors or by attackers who have used fake identification (Section 2.6.2), this 
dissertation is more interested in the patterns of the malicious behaviors rather than 
each malicious behavior of the nodes in a system. Moreover, it is difficult to be sure 
that a node is an attacker by observing a few malicious behaviors. Thus, monitoring 
systems need to be cautious before blocking a node from accessing the systems 
because many normal users can be affected, which is called False Positive. In this 
work, we employed a trust management scheme to quantify the patterns, and we will 
show how well the trust management scheme can represent the patterns of the 
malicious behaviors in this section. 
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4.1.1 Experiment design 
In what follows, we analyzed the host-degree of the European datasets (Section 
1.3) that have been used for community-based statistical analysis in [6]. The authors 
mentioned that the malicious sources often send traffic to many other nodes, and so 
candidates for detection are with high host-degree. Therefore, this experiment focuses 
on the host-degree analysis and shows how the trust management scheme can 
represent the degree-based analysis method over time. We label a node as malicious if 
any node shows higher host-degree than a critical threshold. The threshold values are 
used for creating ROC curves that can show the efficiency of each detection method. 
This experiment compares the efficiency of different behavior patterns to the trust 
management scheme by using the ROC curves and the corresponding AUCs. 
 
4.1.1.1 Degree-based pattern analysis methods 
Here, we apply three possible accumulative over time patterns of malicious 
behaviors: Everyday, Average Degree, and At Least Once. 
 Everyday: Node is labeled as malicious if the node showed higher host-degrees 
than the threshold every day. The procedures are shown in APPENDIX I.B. 
 Average Degree: Node is labeled as malicious if the average host-degrees of 
the nodes during the 14 days is greater than the threshold. The procedures are 
shown in APPENDIX I.C. 
 At Least Once: Node is labeled as malicious if the node showed higher host-
degrees than the threshold at least once during the 14 days. The procedures are 
shown in APPENDIX I.D. 
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It is worth noting that the At Least Once method is the most stringent, the 
Everyday method is the least stringent, and the Average Degree method is a 
moderately stringent monitoring strategy. 
The ROC curves for each pattern were created by using the pseudocodes in 
APPENDIX I.B, C, D based on the above conditions with the host-degree thresholds 
from 1 (the minimum host-degree during the 14 days) to 6455 (the maximum host-
degree during the 14 days). Each day, we classified a node as malicious, if a node 
showed a higher host-degree than the host-degree threshold. After 14 days, we 
classified a node as malicious if a node was malicious everyday according to Everyday 
accumulation pattern, or at least once during 14 days according to At Least Once 
pattern, or if its average host-degree was above average according to Average Degree 
pattern.  After classifying each node as malicious or not with the specified method, we 
determined if the node was present in the DShield Logs to compute the TPR, FPR, and 
ROC curves. Please note that the DShield Logs are not a perfect representation of all 
malicious nodes, and our methods can only detect the malicious behaviors based on 
host-degree information, such as hostscan or a hybrid-scan (Section 2.6.1). Therefore, 
the ROC curves cannot represent the absolute efficiency of each method but can be 
used for comparing the efficiency of different methods. 
We computed each ROC curve by checking that the detected malicious nodes 
based on the three methods are present in the DShield Logs or not. When a detected 
malicious node is in the DShield Logs, it increases the number of True Positives (TP) 
by one while if the node is not on the DShield Logs, it increases the number of False 
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Positives (FP) by one. When a node is in the DShield Logs but is not classified as a 
malicious node, it increases the number of False Negative (FN) by one while if the 
node is not listed in the DShield Logs, it increases the number of True Negative (TN) 
by one. The True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) are computed 
using (17) and (18). 
 
ܴܶܲ ൌ ܶܲܶܲ ൅ ܨܰ (17)
ܨܴܲ ൌ ܨܲܶܰ ൅ ܨܲ (18) 
The TPR and FPR computed for each host-degree threshold are used for creating a 
ROC curve. Each ROC curve is used for computing the corresponding Area Under a 
ROC Curve (AUC) that is a common evaluation metric for binary classification 
problems. If the classifier is accurate enough , the TPR  increases quickly and the 
AUC is close to 1. 
 
4.1.1.2 Trust-based pattern analysis method 
In this section, we describe how the ROC curves are produced for Trust-based 
detection method. Specifically, we use the following equations that are based on the 
Beta reputation [5] that were described in Section 2.4.2. For each day over the 14 days 
period, we compute the host degree of each node.  If a node shows behavior with the 
host-degree higher than the host-degree threshold, we classify the node’s behavior as 
negative. Otherwise we classify its behavior as positive. The rate of positive behaviors 
and the rate of negative behaviors for each node we accumulated over the 14 days. 
The accumulated values were used to calculate the trust values for each node.  
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ܤ௜௣ሺݐሻ ≔ ܤ௜௣ሺݐ െ 1ሻ ൅ ൞
1 , Behavior ൏ Degree t݄ݎ݁ݏ݄݋݈݀ 
0 , Behavior ൒ Degree t݄ݎ݁ݏ݄݋݈݀ 
 
(19)
ܤ௜௡ሺݐሻ ≔ ܤ௜௡ሺݐ െ 1ሻ ൅ ൞
1 , Behavior ൒ Degree t݄ݎ݁ݏ݄݋݈݀ 
0 , Behavior ൏ Degree t݄ݎ݁ݏ݄݋݈݀ 
 
(20)
௜ܶሺݐሻ ≔ ܤ௜
௣ሺݐሻ ൅ 1
ܤ௜௣ሺݐሻ ൅ ܤ௜௡ሺݐሻ ൅ 2
 (21)
 
 In Equations (19), (20), and (21), t represents the number of days over which the trust 
is accumulated, ௜ܶ represents the trust value of node i,  ܤ௜௣ represents the number of 
positive behaviors of node i, and ܤ௜௡ represents the number of negative behaviors of 
node i. The detailed procedures are shown in APPENDIX I.E. 
The trust values calculated using Equations (19), (20), and (21) with host-degree 
thresholds from 1 (the minimum host-degree during the 14 days) to 6455 (the 
maximum host-degree during the 14 days), were utilized to produce the ROC curves.  
In order to create the ROC curve, we had to define a way to use trust to determine if a 
node is malicious.  To do this, we considered the trust value after day 14 and selected 
a trust value under which we would label the node as malicious, the trust threshold.  
We constructed nine different ROC curves using trust thresholds ranging from 0.1 to 
0.9 with 0.1 intervals. We then compare the detected malicious nodes based on the 
trust to the DShield Logs and compute the corresponding TP, FP, FN, and TN. These 
numbers are used for computing each True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive 
75 
 
Rate (FPR) by using (17) and (18), and to create the ROC curves and the 
corresponding AUCs depending on each trust threshold. 
 
4.1.2 Experimental results 
Figure 21 shows the ROC curves for three simple accumulative methods (i.e., 
Everyday, Average Degree, and At Least Once) and the trust-based method. Among 
the three malicious patterns, the At Least Once method showed the highest detection 
efficiency, and it means that the method showed the detection efficiency close to the 
DShield Logs. In other words, the DShield Logs also classified the malicious nodes 
with one or a few behaviors. However, there is a possibility that the malicious 
behaviors have been caused by unintentional temporary error or an attacker has used a 
fake identification, so ADSs should not classify a malicious node with a few malicious 
behaviors as we discussed in Section 2.6.2. In other words, detecting a malicious node 
with a few malicious behaviors cannot be the best practice in an ADS because it 
increases False Positive, which is one of the disadvantages of the ADSs. 
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 Figure 21. Relationships between the degree-based analysis and trust-based  
analysis. 
 
 
One interesting observation we made was that two lines in each analysis were 
overlapped, which are the Everyday malicious and trust threshold 0.1 pairs and the At 
Least Once malicious and trust threshold 0.9 pairs. Moreover, the trust threshold 0.7 
showed very similar line to the Average Degree malicious. We explain these results 
below. 
 Everyday and 0.1 pairs: If a node showed malicious behaviors every day 
during the 14 days, the trust of the node would be 
ሺ0 ൅ 1ሻ ሺ0 ൅ 14 ൅ 2ሻ ൌ 0.0625⁄ . If the node showed only one normal 
behavior during the 14 days, the trust of the node would be 
ሺ1 ൅ 1ሻ ሺ1 ൅ 13 ൅ 2ሻ ൌ 0.125⁄ . Thus, when we set the trust threshold to 0.1, 
every node that showed malicious behaviors every day during the 14 days will 
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be classified as malicious. This is why these two graphs showed the identical 
results. 
 At Least Once and 0.9 pairs: If a node showed normal behaviors every day 
during the 14 days, the node would have its trust value 
ሺ14 ൅ 1ሻ ሺ14 ൅ 0 ൅ 2ሻ ൌ 0.9375⁄  while if the node showed only one 
malicious behavior during the 14 days, the trust value would be 
ሺ13 ൅ 1ሻ ሺ13 ൅ 1 ൅ 2ሻ ൌ 0.875⁄ . Thus, when we set the trust threshold to 0.9, 
every node that showed malicious behavior at least once during the 14 days 
will be classified as malicious. Therefore, these two graphs showed the same 
results. 
 
From the Everyday and 0.1 pairs and the At Least Once and 0.9 pairs, we can 
deduce following equation that decides the corresponding trust threshold. 
 
௧ܶ௛ ൌ ݇ ൅ 1݀ ൅ 2 (22)
 
, where the trust threshold ௧ܶ௛  can represent the behavior pattern with at least k 
malicious behaviors over d days. These results showed we can represent the Everyday 
and At Least Once accumulative methods  with the trust method simply by changing 
the trust threshold. More generally,  the trust-based analysis can provide flexibility for 
system designers who can vary of strictness of the monitoring system by choosing the 
trust thresholds. 
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4.3 Static and adaptive thresholds 
In Section 4.2 we have shown that the trust management scheme can be used to 
represent various malicious patterns of behavior and provide a flexible design for the 
system designers. The trust management scheme depends on a threshold that is used to 
evaluate a behavior and to determine whether it is normal (reliable) or malicious 
(unreliable). In this section, we present the modified trust calculation, which we 
proposed in Section 3.2, and demonstrate that using an adaptive threshold is more 
efficient than using static thresholds in a dynamic environment. 
 
4.3.1 Experiment design 
In what follows, we compare the use of the adaptive threshold to five different 
static thresholds with ROC curves and AUCs. We chose a constant value of 2 for the 
first static threshold and show that if the threshold is too low, the rate of false positive 
can be excessive. Other three values of the thresholds are determined based on the 
average, which is the most popular and well-known measure of central tendency [90]; 
the average degree of all the nodes, average degree of the nodes that are not listed in 
the DShield Logs, and the average degree of the nodes that were listed in the DShield 
Logs. The last static threshold was determined based on the True Positive Rate (TPR) 
of the ROC curves during the 14 days. We analyzed the ROC curves and chose the 
value that ensured above 70% TPR over the 14 days.  
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4.3.1.1 Static thresholds for the host-degree analysis 
Day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Not In 7.28 6.82 6.92 7.14 8.91 8.83 6.22 6.23 
In 120.61 132.07 121.28 129.7 121.83 108.95 108.67 127.61
All 8.55 8.32 8.23 8.53 10.96 10.65 7.53 7.64 
Day 9 10 11 12 13 14 Average 
Not In 6.48 6.71 6.79 9.14 9.08 6.35 ≈ 7.35 
In 128.9 149.1 150.33 118.87 145.67 211.06 ≈ 133.9 
All 7.94 8.2 8.27 11.02 11.13 7.79 ≈ 8.91 
 Table 3. Average host-degree on each day 
 
Table 3 shows the average host-degrees on each day and the average host-degrees 
over the 14 days for each category (i.e., All nodes, nodes In DShield list, nodes Not In 
DShield list). From the results above, we determined three static thresholds: 7 - the 
average host-degree of the nodes not listed in the DShield Logs; 9  - the average host-
degree of all nodes, and 134 - the average host-degrees of the nodes listed in the 
DShield Logs. Since a host-degree is a number of connections, we have rounded  the 
averages in Table 3. The static threshold of 134 is used to illustrate the risk of 
choosing a threshold that is too high. In this case, the detection rate is low., We have 
observes that the malicious sources often send traffic to many other nodes and hence 
have a high out-degree. 
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Threshold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 … 
Day-1 1 0.95 0.91 0.85 0.78 0.72 0.67 … 
Day-2 1 0.93 0.89 0.84 0.79 0.75 0.71 … 
Day-3 1 0.95 0.9 0.86 0.84 0.79 0.75 … 
Day-4 1 0.93 0.89 0.84 0.79 0.76 0.71 … 
Day-5 1 0.94 0.87 0.8 0.77 0.74 0.69 … 
Day-6 1 0.93 0.88 0.85 0.79 0.74 0.69 … 
Day-7 1 0.95 0.88 0.8 0.73 0.67 0.65 … 
Day-8 1 0.93 0.87 0.81 0.77 0.73 0.69 … 
Day-9 1 0.94 0.89 0.83 0.77 0.7 0.67 … 
Day-10 1 0.93 0.83 0.79 0.74 0.67 0.64 … 
Day-11 1 0.92 0.86 0.81 0.75 0.72 0.69 … 
Day-12 1 0.95 0.88 0.82 0.76 0.73 0.67 … 
Day-13 1 0.92 0.85 0.79 0.74 0.7 0.66 … 
Day-14 1 0.94 0.9 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.76 … 
 Table 4. TPR of the host-degree based analysis on each degree threshold 
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Threshold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 … 
Day-1 1 0.5 0.34 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.15 … 
Day-2 1 0.5 0.32 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.14 … 
Day-3 1 0.5 0.33 0.25 0.2 0.17 0.14 … 
Day-4 1 0.5 0.33 0.25 0.2 0.17 0.15 … 
Day-5 1 0.57 0.41 0.32 0.27 0.23 0.21 … 
Day-6 1 0.56 0.4 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.19 … 
Day-7 1 0.49 0.32 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.13 … 
Day-8 1 0.49 0.32 0.23 0.18 0.16 0.13 … 
Day-9 1 0.49 0.32 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.14 … 
Day-10 1 0.49 0.32 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.14 … 
Day-11 1 0.5 0.33 0.24 0.2 0.17 0.15 … 
Day-12 1 0.56 0.41 0.32 0.27 0.23 0.2 … 
Day-13 1 0.57 0.4 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.19 … 
Day-14 1 0.49 0.31 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.14 … 
 Table 5. FPR of the host-degree based analysis on each degree threshold 
 
By analyzing the ROC curves over the 14 days, we select another static threshold. 
Based on the TPR and FPR calculated using the host-degree threshold from 1 to 6455 
and summarized in Table 4 and Table 5, we choose the host-degree threshold of 5 that 
ensured the TPR above 70% over the 14 days. The shaded part of Table 4 shows that 
the TPR was at least 73% while the FPR was at best 26% during the 14 days as shown 
in the shaded part of Table 5. 
In conclusion, we chose the five static thresholds for the host-degree based 
analysis; 7, 9, and 134 based on the averages, 5 based on the TPR analysis, and a 
constant threshold of 2. 
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4.3.1.2 Static thresholds for the port-degree analysis 
Day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Not In 10.82  10.88 10.84 11.5 16.59 16.42 10.4 9.65 
In 125.67  129.11 115.2 125.54 121.88 122.17 98.27 108.5
All 12.1  12.29 12.04 12.8 18.5 18.35 11.52 10.8 
Day 9 10 11 12 13 14 Average 
Not In 9.71 10.21 10.72 16.37 15.28 9.34 ≈ 12.05 
In 113.85 133.78 126 101.97 127.9 209.59 ≈ 125.67 
All 10.95 11.51 11.91 17.84 16.97 10.76 ≈ 13.45 
 Table 6. Average port-degree on each day 
 
Table 6 shows the average port-degrees on each day and the average port-degrees 
over the 14 days for each category of nodes category (All nodes, nodes In DShield list, 
nodes Not In DShield list). From these results, we determine three static thresholds 
similarly to Section 4.3.1.1. Specifically, we fix threshold values at 12, 13, and 126, 
the average port-degree of the nodes not listed in the DShield Logs, the average port-
degree of all the nodes, and the average port-degree of the nodes listed in the DShield 
Logs respectively. Since a port-degree is a number of, we rounded the averages. The 
static threshold 126 was also selected to illustrate the risk risk of choosing a threshold 
that is too high. 
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Threshold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 … 
Day-1 1 0.94 0.89 0.82 0.77 0.71 0.67 … 
Day-2 1 0.91 0.87 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.71 … 
Day-3 1 0.94 0.88 0.84 0.82 0.79 0.75 … 
Day-4 1 0.92 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.73 … 
Day-5 1 0.93 0.85 0.78 0.75 0.71 0.68 … 
Day-6 1 0.93 0.87 0.83 0.78 0.72 0.69 … 
Day-7 1 0.93 0.87 0.79 0.73 0.68 0.65 … 
Day-8 1 0.91 0.86 0.81 0.76 0.73 0.69 … 
Day-9 1 0.93 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.69 0.66 … 
Day-10 1 0.92 0.84 0.79 0.74 0.67 0.64 … 
Day-11 1 0.91 0.85 0.82 0.75 0.71 0.69 … 
Day-12 1 0.94 0.87 0.81 0.77 0.73 0.67 … 
Day-13 1 0.92 0.85 0.78 0.74 0.7 0.68 … 
Day-14 1 0.92 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.73 … 
 Table 7. TPR of the port-degree based analysis on each degree threshold 
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Threshold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 … 
Day-1 1 0.4 0.29 0.24 0.2 0.18 0.16 … 
Day-2 1 0.39 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.16 … 
Day-3 1 0.38 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.15 … 
Day-4 1 0.38 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.15 … 
Day-5 1 0.51 0.38 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.22 … 
Day-6 1 0.52 0.39 0.32 0.28 0.25 0.22 … 
Day-7 1 0.38 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.15 … 
Day-8 1 0.37 0.26 0.2 0.17 0.15 0.14 … 
Day-9 1 0.37 0.26 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.14 … 
Day-10 1 0.37 0.26 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.14 … 
Day-11 1 0.38 0.27 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.15 … 
Day-12 1 0.5 0.37 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.21 … 
Day-13 1 0.51 0.37 0.31 0.26 0.23 0.21 … 
Day-14 1 0.36 0.25 0.2 0.17 0.15 0.14 … 
 Table 8. FPR of the port-degree based analysis on each degree threshold 
 
Another static threshold has been chosen by analyzing the ROC curves during the 
14 days. The TPR and FPR have been calculated using the port-degree threshold from 
1 (the minimum port-degree during the 14 days) to 14186 (the maximum port-degree 
during the 14 days) and summarized in Table 7 and Table 8. Since the port-degree 
threshold 5 ensures above 70% TPR over the 14 days, we select the last static 
threshold as 5. The shaded part of Table 7 shows that the TPR is at least 73% while 
the FPR is at best 28% during the 14 days. 
Thus, we select the five static thresholds for the host-degree based analysis; 2, 
5,12, 13, and 126. 
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4.3.1.3 Adaptive thresholds for the host-degree and port-degree  
 Figure 22. European dataset log-scaled host-degree histogram 
 
 
Figure 22 shows the host-degree distribution inferred the European network flows, 
and it clearly displays heavy-tailed distribution. Thus, it is reasonable to apply the 
outlier-based adaptive threshold method introduced in Section 2.5. We calculate the 
maximum and minimum thresholds for the trust calculation using Equations (8), (9), 
and (10) by setting up  ߜ ൌ 0.05  and κ ൌ ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	݀ܽݐܽ 4⁄  respectively. The 
detailed procedures are described in APPENDIX I.F. The minimum outlier of the 
host-degree distribution is set to the MaxTh. The MinTh is computed as the average of 
the host-degrees without the outliers (Section 3.2). 
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4.3.1.4 ROC curves and AUC 
In what follows, we produce the ROC curves and the corresponding AUCs for 
each selected threshold and compare the efficiency of the malicious node detection 
algorithms using the adaptive threshold versus using the fixed (static) thresholds. We 
use the Beta reputation, introduced in Section 2.4.2, to calculate the trust values for the 
static thresholds and we use the modified Beta reputation, proposed in Section 3.2, for 
the adaptive threshold method. The latter method incorporates two thresholds, MinTh 
and MaxTh. Since this experiment is designed for comparing the efficiency of the 
adaptive threshold to the static threshold, we minimize the influence of the trust 
management scheme by not accumulating the trust values over the 14 days, but detect 
the malicious nodes based on the trust value daily. 
  
ܰܤܴ௜ ≔ ൞
1 , ܤܸ ൏ ܵݐܽݐ݄݅ܿܶ
0 , ܤܸ ൒ ܵݐܽݐ݄݅ܿܶ
 
(23)
ܯܤܴ௜ ≔ ൞
1 , ܤܸ ൒ ܵݐܽݐ݄݅ܿܶ
0 , ܤܸ ൏ ܵݐܽݐ݄݅ܿܶ
 
(24)
 
௜ܶ ≔ ܰܰܤ௜ ൅ 1ܰܰܤ௜ ൅ ܰܯܤ௜ ൅ 2 
(25)
 
The trust values of each node for the static thresholds (Section 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2) 
were calculated by using Equations (23), (24), and (25) with each threshold. The 
Normal Behavior Rate of node i (ܰܤܴ௜) is set to 1 if the Behavior (BV) of node i does 
not exceed the static threshold while the Malicious Behavior Rate of node i (ܯܤܴ௜) is 
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set to 1 if the BV of node i exceeds the threshold. The Trust of node i ( ௜ܶ) is calculated 
by using the ܰܤܴ௜ and ܯܤܴ௜. 
 
 
ܰܤܴ௜ ≔
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ
 
1 , ܤܸ ൑ ܯ݄݅݊ܶ 
0 , ܤܸ ൒ ܯܽݔ݄ܶ 
1 െ ܤ ௜ܸ െ ܯ݄݅݊ܶܯܽݔ݄ܶ െܯ݄݅݊ܶ , ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ 
 
(26)
 
ܯܤܴ௜ ≔
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ
 
1 , ܤܸ ൒ ܯܽݔ݄ܶ 
0 , ܤܸ ൑ ܯ݄݅݊ܶ 
	 ܤ ௜ܸ െ ܯ݄݅݊ܶܯܽݔ݄ܶ െܯ݄݅݊ܶ , ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ 
 
(27)
 
௜ܶ ≔ ܰܰܤ௜ ൅ 1ܰܰܤ௜ ൅ ܰܯܤ௜ ൅ 2 
(28)
 
The trust values of each node for the adaptive threshold (Section 4.3.1.3) were 
calculated by using (26), (27), and (28). The ܰܤܴ௜ is set to 1 if the BV of node i is less 
than or equal to the minimum threshold while the ܯܤܴ௜ is set to 1 if the BV of node i 
is greater than or equal to the maximum threshold. When the BV of node i is placed 
between the two thresholds, the ܰܤܴ௜ and ܯܤܴ௜ will be set by the equations in (26) 
and (27). The Trust of node i ( ௜ܶ) is computed using the ܰܤܴ௜ and ܯܤܴ௜. 
The calculated trust values for each threshold were evaluated and compared by 
using ROC curves and the corresponding AUCs. The TPR and FPR for the ROC 
curves were calculated with the trust threshold from 0.0 to 1.0 with 0.001 intervals.  
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4.3.2 Experimental results 
In this section, we present the results of 2 days out of 14 days because they showed 
very similar results. The host-degree and port-degree were analyzed separately, and 
the ROC curves and AUC were used for the comparisons.  
 
 Figure 23. Host-degree analysis and the ROC curves for each static threshold and 
the adaptive threshold on Day 1 
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 Figure 24. Host-degree analysis and the ROC curves for each static threshold and 
the adaptive threshold on Day 14 
 
 Figure 25. Host-degree analysis and the AUC during the 14 days (Line plots) 
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 Figure 26. Host-degree analysis and the AUC during the 14 days (Box plots) 
 
 TPR FPR 
Static-2 0.948171 0.504942
Static-5 0.783537 0.207009
Static-7 0.670732 0.154375
Static-9 0.615854 0.12538 
Static-134 0.167683 0.00743 
Adaptive 0.783537 0.207009
 Table 9. The highest TPR of each threshold with the corresponding FPR in the 
Host-degree analysis on Day 1 
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 TPR FPR 
Static-2 0.942568 0.486698
Static-5 0.827703 0.187601
Static-7 0.756757 0.137017
Static-9 0.699324 0.109715
Static-134 0.260135 0.006452
Adaptive 0.858108 0.235536
 Table 10. The highest TPR of each threshold with the corresponding FPR in 
the Host-degree analysis on Day 14 
 
In Figure 23 and Figure 24, the results of the host-degree analysis are presented. 
Each ROC curve represents the efficiency of each threshold, and the points of the 
highest TPR and the corresponding FPR are presented in Table 9 and Table 10. The 
AUCs rank high in the order of using adaptive, static 5, static 7, static 9, static 2, and 
static 134 host-degree thresholds. 
The results clearly show the risks of selecting the degree threshold which is too 
low or too high. The static threshold 2 results in the highest TPR while it also shows 
the highest FPR during the 14 days, implying that many normal nodes can be labeled 
as malicious by the security system that employes the low host-degree threshold. On 
the other hand, the static threshold 134 results in the lowest TPR and the lowest FPR 
during the 14 days, implying that only a small number of normal nodes can be labeled 
as malicious, but also many malicious nodes can be misclassified as normal, adversely 
affecting the system.  
The static threshold of 5, which was the best choice among the static threshold 
deduced from the host-degree threshold-based analysis (Section 4.3.1.1), results in  
relatively stable results. The TPR is greater than for other static thresholds but the 
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static threshold of 2, and the FPR is much lower than the static threshold of 2. We 
observed that in general the TPR increases and the FPR decreases for higher static 
threshold values (see in Table 9 and Table 10). 
The results obtained for the adaptive threshold are similar to the results of using 
the static threshold of 5 in terms of the TPR and the FPR on the first day and a bit 
better on the last day, and much better for other values of static thresholds for all days 
(see Figure 25 and Figure 26). The detailed TPRs and FPRs are listed in APPENDIX 
II.C. 
 
 Figure 27. Port-degree analysis and the ROC curves for each static threshold 
and the adaptive threshold on Day 1 
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 Figure 28. Port-degree analysis and the ROC curves for each static threshold 
and the adaptive threshold on Day 14 
 
 Figure 29. Port-degree analysis and the the AUC during the 14 days (Line 
plots) 
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 Figure 30. Port-degree analysis and the AUC during the 14 days (Box plots) 
 
 TPR FPR 
Static-2 0.935976 0.40396 
Static-5 0.77439 0.202861
Static-12 0.557927 0.111695
Static-13 0.542683 0.10423 
Static-126 0.140244 0.01296 
Adaptive 0.77439 0.202861
 Table 11. The highest TPR of each threshold with the corresponding FPR in 
the Port-degree analysis on Day 1 
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 TPR FPR 
Static-2 0.918919 0.364921
Static-5 0.790541 0.173059
Static-12 0.614865 0.0938 
Static-13 0.594595 0.088407
Static-126 0.236486 0.010931
Adaptive 0.790541 0.173059
 Table 12. The highest TPR of each threshold with the corresponding FPR in 
the Port-degree analysis on Day 14 
 
The ROC curves for the port-degree analysis are presented in Figure 27 and Figure 
28. The results are similar to the host-degree analysis; the adaptive threshold-based 
method is the most accurate, and the static threshold-based detection accuracy ranks in 
the order of threshold values of 5, 12, 13, 2, and 126. However, the host-degree 
analysis resulted in slightly better performance than the port-degree analysis. 
Again, the results support the risks of choosing the threshold that is too low or too 
high. The static threshold of 2 shows the highest TPR with the highest FPR, thereby 
misclassifying many normal nodes as malicious. On the other hand, the static 
threshold of 126 resuts in the lowest TPR and the lowest FPR during the 14 days, 
thereby misclassifying many malicious nodes as normal.  
The static threshold 5, which was the best choice of the static threshold deduced 
from the port-degree threshold-based analysis (Section 4.3.1.2), shows the competitive  
TPR and FPR compared to the other static thresholds. The relationships between the 
threshold, TPR, and FPR in the port-degree analysis is similar to the one observed for 
the host-degree analysis. The adaptive threshold-based method shows the best 
detection performance resulting in higher AUCs during the 14 days than the other 
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static thresholds (see Figure 29 and Figure 30.). The detailed TPR and FPR of the 
intersections are listed in APPENDIX II.D. 
In conclusion, in this section we show that the trust management scheme with the 
adaptive threshold provides the superior detection performance compared to the trust 
management scheme with the static thresholds. 
 
4.3.3 Static threshold for clustering coefficient 
As we discussed in Section 2.5, the clustering coefficient does not follow the 
heavy-tailed distribution, so we cannot apply the adaptive threshold method for this 
analysis, and needed to set a static threshold. To find the best static threshold, we 
composed the same experiments described in Section 4.3.2. 
 Figure 31. Clustering coefficient analysis and the AUC during the 14 days (Line 
plots) 
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 Figure 32. Clustering coefficient analysis and the AUC during the 14 days (Line 
plots) 
  
Figure 31 and Figure 32 show that the results of the clustering coefficient-based 
malicious node detection. Each ROC curve represents the efficiency of each threshold. 
We have tested the static thresholds every 0.05 from 0.05 to 1.0. As shown in the 
figures, the AUC increases as the static threshold increased. Among the static 
threshold candidates, we select the 0.95 for the static threshold of clustering 
coefficients for further experiments. 
 
4.4 Detecting attacks using trust management scheme 
In previous sections, we showed that the trust management scheme could be used 
to accumulate node behaviors over time (Section 4.2), and in combination with the 
proposed adaptive threshold selection could provide superior detection performance 
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compared to static threshold selection (Section 4.3). In this Section, we analyze the 
European and URI datasets (Section 1.3) by using the trust management scheme, 
which includes the modified Beta reputation with the proposed adaptive threshold 
(Section 3.2), Predictability trust (Section 3.3), and Overall trust (Section 3.4).  
This section focuses on three main analyses:  
 Daily malicious behavior analysis: We have analyzed four different types of 
behaviors on each day using graph-based characteristics including: the host-
degree, port-degree, betweenness centrality, and clustering coefficient 
discussed in Section 2.3. We evaluate the node behaviors using the adaptive 
thresholds (Section 2.5 and 3.2), and the modified Beta reputation for the host-
degree, port-degree, and betweenness centrality, characteristics that follow 
heavy-taild distribution. We evaluate the node behaviors using the clustering 
coefficient with a static threshold 0.95 since it does not follow the heavy-tailed 
distribution as discussed in Section 4.3.   
 Multi-day malicious behavior analysis: The main purpose of this analysis is 
to identify the persistent malicious nodes. Each node in a network is identified 
by an IP address, and the daily malicious behavior analysis is performed based 
on the IP address. However, there exist many methods in which an attacker can 
hide or change their IP addresses (Section 2.6.2). Thus, it could be dangerous 
classifying a malicious node with a few behaviors because it would affect the 
normal user who has used or will use the IP address. This dissertation claims 
that an ADS needs to be cautious to evaluate a node and should not classify a 
malicious node with a few malicious behaviors. It would be ideal if a secure 
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system could store and observe the entire behaviors of each node and analyze 
them, but it is unattainable due to the limited storage and processor speed. 
Therefore, we employ the modified Beta reputation that provides a cumulative 
behavior evaluation method (Section 3.2) and observe each node for several 
days. The trust values are used for detecting the malicious nodes that show 
several malicious behaviors over the observation period. 
 Aggregation of multiple trust values: An attacker may perform more than 
one type of attack over the observation period. It would be difficult to detect a 
malicious node by analyzing only one of the behaviors if an attacker performed 
hostscan on the first observation day, portscan on the second day, and any 
other types of attacks on the following days. Thus, it is important for security 
systems to have an ability to aggregate the results of multiple analyses into one 
to detect such an attacker. This research proposed two different trust values for 
the aggregation of multiple trust values; the predictability trust (Section 3.3) 
and the overall trust (Section 3.4). Since each behavior may affect the 
calculation of the predictability trust as shown in Section 3.3, it can reflect the 
behavior pattern of the node. Also, we present four different types of 
aggregation method in Section 3.4 that can be implemented in other methods. 
 
4.4.1  Experiment design 
This dissertation focus is on the analyses the European and URI datasets and 
detection of the hostscan, portscan, hybrid-scan, and any types of attacks that do not 
respect the community boundaries by using the proposed methods in Chapter 3. The 
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reasons we focus on these two datasets are the following: 1) the European dataset 
contains the ground truth in a form of DShield Logs that can be used for validation, 
however 2) the European dataset is limited to 14-days of network flows and contains 
no node attributes, 3) the URI dataset contains 90-days of network flows with nodes 
that can be classified as URI clients, URI servers, and non-URI nodes, but it does not 
have a ground truth for evaluation.  
 
4.4.1.1 Settings for the Predictability trust and Overall trust 
As discussed in Section 2.4.3, the predictability trust was developed for detecting 
On-off patterns. Since there is a possibility that an attacker performs the hostscan, 
portscan, and the other types of attacks alternatively, the attacker may disturb the trust 
management schemes. We consider and integrate the trust of the host-degree, port-
degree, betweenness centrality, and clustering coefficient for the predictability trust. 
However, we do not consider the behaviors when nodes are labeled as suspicious, 
having node characteristics between the MaxTh and MinTh. The pseudocode is shown 
in APPENDIX I.A. If one of the characteristics exceeds the MaxTh, we increase the 
MPB while all characteristics need to be lower than the MinTh to increase the NPB. 
By using the obtained NPB and MPB, we calculate the predictability trust values for 
each node with (5).  
The predictability trust requires two more parameters, which are a minimum 
window size and a maximum window size, for the sliding windows. We set the 
parameters to 5 and 72 for the minimum and maximum window sizes, respectively. 
The parameters make the sliding windows for the Predictability Trust big enough to 
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detect up to 5N-1M On-off attacks [68]. The window size of the dynamic sliding 
windows can be calculated by equation (29). Thus, the dynamic sliding window can 
change the observation size depending on the current trust.  
 
ܵ݅ݖ݁ ≔ െ67 ൈ ௜ܶ ൅ 72 (29)
 
, where the ௜ܶ represents the current overall trust value of node i.  
When a node is unreliable  ( ௜ܶ ൌ 0.0), the size will be 72 while the node is fully 
reliable ( ௜ܶ ൌ 1.0 ), the size will be 5. If the node is suspicious ( ௜ܶ ൌ 0.5 ), the 
observation size will be 39. However, we need a large dataset to fully test the 
predictability trust because the European dataset has only 14 days. The dataset would 
never fill the dynamic sliding windows when it requires the maximum size 
observation, and we would not be able to observe long-term redemption, which allows 
a second chance to a malicious node based on a long-term observation.  
The overall trust is defined to integrate the various trust values into one to quickly 
detect malicious behaviors of each node. There are many ways that one can implement 
the overall trust, such as an average of all the trust values, maximum trust value, or 
minimum value as discussed in Section 3.4. We use the minimum value method in this 
research for the quick detection of a malicious node. If any of the characteristics 
exhibit a malicious behavior, it will be directly projected to the overall trust. 
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4.4.1.2 European dataset analysis scenario 
The European dataset has been analyzed through several steps as shown in Figure 
33. In this section, we describe each step from the data collection to evaluation. 
Figure 33. Data Analysis Scenario of the European dataset 
 
A. Collect raw data: As described in Section 1.3, the dataset has been collected by 
European Internet Service Provider in 2007 for 14 days, and it was sampled 
1:1000. The dataset was collected with DShield Logs that contain the IP addresses 
of malicious nodes. 
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B. Infer node characteristics from the network flows: In graph theory, the degree 
represents the number of edges from the vertex and to the vertex. In network 
analysis, it shows the number of connections from a source node to the destination 
nodes. This can be very valuable information that could indicate that a source node 
is an attacker or that a destination node has been attacked by an adversary that 
usually shows high degrees (i.e. DDoS, probing, and etc.) [6], [58]. In this 
dissertation, we used the host-degrees, port-degrees, betweenness centrality, and 
clustering coefficient to evaluate the behaviors of each node (Section 2.3). This 
stage infers node characteristic information from the European network flows 
datasets. The most intuitive way to identify super spreaders or attack nodes, such 
as hostscan or portscan attackers, is to count the number of flows generated by 
each host within a measurement period [6], [92]. We counted the number of 
destination IP addresses from each source node for the host-degree information 
and counted the number of destination ports from each source node for the port-
degree information on each day. If the host-degree or port-degree of a node is 
greater than a threshold, there is a high possibility that the node was an attack node 
that has scanned multiple hosts or ports. Besides, as we described in Section 2.3, if 
nodes a and b share at least one common destination, they are connected in the 
bipartite network projection [58]. Ding et al. formed a projection graph to identify 
communities in the network and utilized it to find malicious nodes, which do not 
respect community boundaries, by using the betweenness centrality and clustering 
coefficient in [6]. This dissertation also employs the betweenness centrality and 
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clustering coefficient to identify the nodes that do not respect community 
boundaries, that are calculated from the projection graph by using the MatlabBGL 
package in Matlab [93]. 
 
C. Trust Calculation: This dissertation proposes and employes the modified Beta 
reputation with heavy-tailed outlier-based adaptive threshold for the trust 
computation (Section 3.3). By using the heavy-tailed outlier detection method, we 
set the MaxTh and MinTh to determine normal, malicious, and suspicious 
behaviors for the modified Beta reputation. By using the adaptive thresholds, we 
calculate the trust values for the host-degree, port-degree, and betweenness 
centrality for each node on each day. We use the static thresholds for clustering 
coefficient that does not follow the heavy-tailed distribution.  
 
D. Evaluation: We search for malicious behaviors in the European dataset network 
flows during the 14 days based on the trust values. We select the sample malicious 
nodes in Section 4.4.2 by sorting the latest trust values in the ascending order and 
look for the attack signatures in Section 2.6.1. 
 
E. Comparison: The European dataset uses the DShield Logs as the ground truth 
dataset. Using the proposed methods, we detect malicious nodes and check 
whether the detected nodes are listed in the DShield Logs. Through this step, we 
verify the proposed methods as well as the DShield Logs.  
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4.4.1.3 URI dataset analysis scenario 
The University of Rhode Island (URI) Network Dataset has been analyzed 
through several steps as shown in Figure 34. In this section, we describe each step 
from the data collection to evaluation. 
 
Figure 34. Data Analysis Scenario of the URI dataset 
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A. Collect raw data: As described in Section 1.3, the dataset has been collected by 
University of Rhode Island Information Technology Service (URI-ITS) for 90 
days, and it sampled 1:100. This data does not contain the ground truth of attacks, 
but it does contain a list of URI servers that has been formed by performing port 
scanning on the network of University of Rhode Island (URI). 
 
B. Clean up the network flows of DNS servers: A Domain Name System (DNS) 
server runs a service that translates more readily memorized domain names to the 
numerical identification of addressing component. For example, DNS servers 
provide responses to the queries of human-memorable domain names and 
hostnames with the corresponding numeric Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Since 
most of the connections from the outside of the university access to the URI-DNS 
server to search the matching IP addresses, the server showed extremely high out-
degree and in-degree. More specifically, the top hierarchy of the DNS is served by 
the root name servers maintained by delegation by the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Below the root, Internet resources are 
organized into a hierarchy of domains, administered by the respective registers and 
domain name holders [94]. If a name server does not have information that can 
answer the query it may recursively query name servers higher up in the hierarchy. 
Because of this nature of DNS servers, the servers generally have many 
destinations that is enough to distract the degree based statistical analysis. Thus, 
we have cleaned up the network flows of the URI-DNS servers in this research for 
a more accurate statistical analysis and evaluation. 
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C. Infer node characteristics from the network flows: As discussed in Section 
4.4.1.1, the degree represents the number of edges from the vertex and to the 
vertex, and this information can be very valuable information for detecting attacks 
such as DDoS, probing, and etc. [6], [58]. We characterize each node by using the 
host-degrees, port-degrees, betweenness centrality, and clustering coefficient. This 
stage infers these node characteristics from the URI network flows datasets. 
Specifically, the host-degrees and port-degrees are computed by counting the 
number of connections from each source node from the bipartite graph, and the 
betweenness centrality and clustering coefficient that used for identifying the 
nodes that do not respect community boundaries are computed from the projection 
graph by using the MatlabBGL [93]. 
 
D. Separate the nodes into URI and non-URI: Since we are more interested in 
detecting attacks and/or malicious behaviors from/to the university network. Thus, 
we separate the dataset into two parts; URI and non-URI nodes based on the IP 
addresses that are assigned to the University of Rhode Island. For our 
convenience, we defined a few terms for the flows. 
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 Figure 35. Definitions of terms of the network flows 
 
a. URI nodes, From flows: The source IP addresses belong to the URI 
Network and the destination IP addresses do not belong to the URI 
Network. 
b. non-URI nodes, To flows: The source IP addresses do not belong to 
the URI Network, and the destination IP addresses belong to the URI 
Network. 
 
E. Separate the nodes into server and client: We have also separated the URI 
nodes into two parts; URI servers (or simply, servers) and URI clients (or simply, 
clients) because we assumed that server and client nodes have different host-
degree and port-degree characteristics. To collect the information of the server and 
client nodes, we have composed a port scanning technique to the URI network and 
searched the service information on each URI nodes. This research expectation is  
that the server nodes would have different outliers from the client nodes group 
because the servers generally get connection requests rather than requesting 
connections. However, there are three facts that we need to consider. First, the port 
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scanning technique does not guarantee it detects all the open ports because some 
systems employ protection techniques that do not reveal the information. Second, 
even if any ports are opened on a node, it does not mean that the node is a server, 
but it can be used as a server. Third, all the scanned ports are not opened for 
providing services as a server. Thus, this dissertation considers the ports that 
provide popular services as shown in Table 13. 
 
Service Port Number 
File Transfer Protocol (FTP) 21 
Secure Shell (SSH) 22 
Telnet remote login service 23 
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) 25 
Domain Name System (DNS) service 53 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 80 
Post Office Protocol (POP3) 110 
Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) 143 
HTTP Secure (HTTPS) 443 
SMTP Secure (SMTPS) 465 
   
Table 13. List of the Well-Known Ports 
 
F. Trust Calculation: We set the MaxTh and MinTh to determine normal, malicious, 
and suspicious behaviors for the modified Beta reputation by using the heavy-
tailed outlier method and calculated the trust values for the host-degree, port-
degree, clustering coefficient, and betweenness centrality for each node on each 
day. 
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G. Evaluation: We search malicious behaviors patterns in the URI network flows 
during the 90 days based on the trust values. We present examples of a few 
malicious nodes in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 and summarize the results for the 
whole URI data in Section 4.6 and 4.7. 
 
 
4.4.2 Experimental results 
In this section, we will show how the trust management scheme can be used to 
identify the malicious nodes. The detected malicious nodes in the European dataset 
will be compared to the DShield Logs. We will verify the proposed methods as well as 
the DShield Logs. The URI dataset will show how the trust management scheme 
works on a large dataset including the long-term redemption. Since there does not 
exist ground truth of the attack nodes for the URI datasets, we rely on the collected 
raw data and human expert to verify the relationships between the trust and malicious 
behaviors. Therefore, we have built a database system that can retrieve the raw data by 
using SQL, and we will use the raw data to confirm the malicious behaviors.  
By using the calculated trust values, we will take a second look at the behaviors 
and evaluate the trust values node by node. We illustrate behaviors of a few nodes 
similar to a hostscan, portscan, hybrid-scan, or other types of attacks. We also use for 
illustration the nodes that show the behaviors of one of the attacks but are not listed in 
the DShield Logs to demonstrate that these logs are not a perfect representation of all 
malicious nodes.  
 
111 
 
4.4.2.1 Normal nodes 
 (a). The host-degrees of a normal node 
 
 (b). The port-degrees of a normal node 
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 (c). The betweenness centrality of a normal node 
 
  (d). The clustering coefficient of a normal node 
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 (e). The trust changes of a normal node 
Figure 36. A normal node that has not been classified as malicious 
 
Figure 36 shows the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a normal 
node that is not listed in the DShield Logs, and the trust management scheme has 
classified this as a normal node. The host-degree, port-degree, and betweenness 
centrality never exceeded the MinTh as shown in Figure 36.(a), (b), and (c) 
respectively. Figure 36.(d) shows that the clustering coefficient also never went below 
the static threshold 0.95. This means that the node has executed neither hostscan nor 
portscan signatures/behaviors, and so it is expected to have the high HT, PT, CCT, 
BCT, PRT, and OT values as shown in Figure 36.(e).  
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4.4.2.2 Hostscan attacks 
 (a). The host-degrees of a hostscan attack node 
 
 (b). The port-degrees of a hostscan attack node 
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 (c). The betweenness centrality of a hostscan attack node 
 
 (d). The clustering coefficient of a hostscan attack node 
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 (e). The trust changes of a hostscan attack node 
Figure 37. A hostscan attack node that has been classified as malicious 
 
Figure 37 shows each behavior and the corresponding trust changes of a node that 
has been listed in the DShield Logs, and the trust management scheme classified as a 
hostscan attack node. The red lines in Figure 37.(a), (b), (c), and (d) represent the 
node’s behaviors during the 14 days, and the trust values have been calculated based 
on the behaviors. We could observe the host-degrees exceeded the MaxTh (blue line) 
every day, the port-degrees slightly exceeded the MinTh (green line) except on the 5th 
day, the betweenness centrality exceeded the MinTh only once on the 4th day but never 
exceeded the MaxTh, and the clustering coefficient were below the static threshold 
0.95 every day. Therefore, we can expect that the Host Trust (HT), Betweenness 
Centrality Trust (BCT), Clustering Coefficient Trust (CCT), Predictability Trust 
(PRT), and Overall Trust (OT) will be low while the Port Trust (PT) will be high. The 
blue line in Figure 37.(e) represents PT over the 14 days, and it showed the high trust 
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values while the HT (red line), CCT (green line), BCT (yellow line), PRT (purple line), 
and OT (cyan line) showed low values as we expected.  
The hostscan attack nodes tend to show high host-degrees and low port-degrees 
as we described in Section 2.6.1.1. Therefore, we can specify the attack nodes that 
showed the hostscan patterns during the 14 days by searching the low HT and high PT. 
Besides, we could observe that the nodes with low HT also showed low CCT and low 
BCT because a node with high port-degrees would have high possibility to be 
connected to many communities. Thus, the hostscan attack node also showed a type of 
behaviors that do not respect the community boundaries (Section 2.3.4 and 2.3.5). We 
also were able to classify the node as malicious with the low PRT and OT. These 
results shows that the proposed trust management scheme could cautiously detect a 
hostscan attack node in a dynamic environment by decreasing each trust gradually and 
integrate them together.  
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 (a). The host-degrees of a hostscan attack node in the non-URI flows 
 
 (b). The port-degrees of a hostscan attack node in the non-URI flows 
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 (c). The betweenness centrality of a hostscan attack node in the non-URI flows 
 
 (d). The clustering coefficient of a hostscan attack node in the non-URI flows 
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 (e). The trust changes of a hostscan attack node in the non-URI flows 
Figure 38. A hostscan attack node that has been showed in the non-URI flows 
 
We were also able to observe the same attack in the URI dataset. Figure 38 shows 
the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a non-URI node that was 
suspected as a hostscan attack node. The node also showed higher host-degrees than 
the MaxTh except for the 9 times on April 16th, 17th, and 18th and May 14th, 15th, 19th, 
20th, 22nd, and 25th during the 90 days, so we could expect the low HT, PRT, and OT 
values. We also could expect the high PT values because the node tried to access to 
only 1 port every day. This node tried to access to the port 0 (invalid port number), 
which frequently has been used by attackers, on 5,268 different destination IP 
addresses that belong to URI network. The results also illustrate the need of Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) because the firewall, which is the first line of a security 
system (Section 1.1), could not detect and allowed the hostscan attacks. 
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The betweenness centrality and clustering coefficient in Figure 38.(c) and (d) also 
showed malicious behaviors every day during the 90 days. The high betweenness 
centrality represents that the node worked as a bridge between the communities, which 
share the destination nodes with other nodes, and the node belonged to many 
communities. Besides, the low clustering coefficient illustrated that the node was not 
densely connected with the neighbors. Thus, the BCT and CCT showed low values in 
Figure 38.(e), and the values represented the node did not respect the community 
boundaries [6].  
 
 (a). The host-degrees of a hostscan attack node in the URI-server flows 
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 (b). The port-degrees of a hostscan attack node in the URI- server flows 
 
 (c). The betweenness centrality of a hostscan attack node in the URI- server 
flows 
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 (d). The clustering coefficient of a hostscan attack node in the URI- server 
flows 
 
 (e). The trust changes of a hostscan attack node in the URI- server flows 
Figure 39. A hostscan attack node that has been showed in the URI- server 
flows 
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These results shows that the network flows might need to be analyzed separately 
depending on the location of nodes, such as URI and non-URI nodes. Figure 39 shows 
the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a node in the URI-server flows 
that showed a hostscan attack pattern. This node had 52 open ports and got connection 
requests to 66 different ports from 3,699 different source IP addresses. The most 
popular service was provided by the port 80 (HTTP), and 3,312 different source IP 
addresses tried to access to this port. Besides, the port 25 (SMTP) and 23 (TELNET) 
were accessed by 125 and 48 source IP addresses respectively. Thus, the node was a 
high probability of being a server. 
The host-degrees of the node exceeded the MaxTh every day in Figure 39.(a), so 
we could expect low HT values with the low PRT and OT values. On the other hand, 
the port-degree exceed the MinTh only 18 times but never exceeded the MaxTh during 
the 90 days, so the high PT was expected. Therefore, we could suspect this node might 
be a hostscan node because these results match the signature of the hostscan in Section 
2.6.1.1. The node tried to access to port 0 (invalid port number), 25 (SMTP), and 443 
(HTTPS) on 1,888 different destination IP addresses. The port 0 is not a valid port 
number, but the packets can be formed and frequently used for searching valid hosts 
by attackers. Thus, this node was highly suspicious. By using the proposed trust 
management scheme, we could observe the malicious behaviors over 90 days without 
looking at the raw network flows closely. However, this node might not be classified 
as hostscan node in the client node group because the MinTh and MaxTh for the host-
degree in this figure were much lower than the values in Figure 38. 
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4.4.2.3 Portscan attacks 
 (a). The host-degrees of a portscan attack node 
 
 (b). The port-degrees of a portscan attack node 
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 (c). The betweenness centrality of a portscan attack node 
 
 (d). The clustering coefficient of a portscan attack node 
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 (e). The trust changes of a portscan attack node 
Figure 40. A portscan attack node that has been classified as malicious 
 
Figure 40 shows the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a node that 
has been listed in the DShield Logs, and the trust management scheme classified as a 
portscan attack node. The host-degrees of the node showed interesting behaviors that 
placed in the suspicious area, which is between the MinTh and MaxTh, as shown in 
Figure 40.(a). Since the host-degrees were suspicious, we can expect that the HT will 
be lower than the normal nodes. Even though the host-degrees were placed in the 
suspicious area, they were closer to the MinTh than the MaxTh, and it was enough to 
increase the HT rather than decreasing the values as shown in Figure 40.(e). If the 
behaviors were closer to the MaxTh than the MinTh, we could expect that the HT was 
slowly getting decreased but not as much as a node that showed higher host-degrees 
than the MaxTh during the 14 days. On the other hand, the port-degrees were above 
the MaxTh during the 14 days except on the 6th, 11th, and 13th days in Figure 40.(b). 
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However, even the behaviors in the 3 days were very close to the MaxTh, and they 
were enough to decrease the PT. Besides, the node did not connect with the neighbors 
strongly enough to have high clustering coefficients as shown in Figure 40.(d). The 
clustering coefficient values were below the static threshold 0.95 during the 14 days, 
and it decreased the CCT as shown in Figure 40.(e). The betweenness centrality values 
showed a kind of On-off patterns as shown in Figure 40.(c). It was below the MinTh 
on the 1st, 3rd, 6th, 10th, 12th, and 13th days while it was above the MaxTh on the 2nd and 
5th days. The behaviors on the 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, and 14th were placed in the 
suspicious area. The behaviors were enough to increase the BCT as shown in Figure 
40.(e), but it could decrease the PRT even if the six out of fourteen behaviors were 
classified as normal. The NPB would be 3, and the MPB would be 2 in (5) on the 14th 
day, so the PTR would be 0.57 if we assumed that the other behaviors were classified 
as normal, and only the betweenness centrality behaved as shown in Figure 40.(c). It 
would be much lower than the BCT shown in Figure 40.(e) that was 0.7,  and it shows 
the PTR would work as we expected that was described in Section 2.4.3 and 3.3.  
The portscan attack nodes tend to show low host-degrees and high port-degrees as 
we described in Section 2.6.1.2. Therefore, we can specify the nodes that showed 
portscan patterns during the 14 days by searching the high HT and low PT. The low 
CCT and BCT showed the possibility that the node also performed a kind of behaviors 
that did not respect the communities’ boundaries. The PRT and OT also could be a 
clue that the trust management scheme successfully detected the malicious behaviors. 
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 (a). The host-degrees of a portscan attack node in the URI-server flows 
 
 (b). The port-degrees of a portscan attack node in the URI-server flows 
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 (c). The betweenness centrality of a portscan attack node in the URI-server 
flows 
 
 (d). The clustering coefficient of a portscan attack node in the URI-server flows 
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 (e). The trust changes of a portscan attack node in the URI- server flows 
Figure 41. A portscan attack node that has been showed in the URI- server 
flows 
 
The trust management scheme was able to complement a weakness of the outlier-
based adaptive threshold. Figure 41 shows the behaviors and the corresponding trust 
changes of a URI-server node that showed portscan attack pattern during the 90 days. 
This node had 33 open ports and got connection requests to 43 different ports from 
137 different source IP addresses. The most popular port was 23 (TELNET), and 38 
nodes tried to access to this port. The second popular port was 5,000 (UPNP-EVNT) 
that is used by Universal Plug N’ Play devices, and both ports could provide services 
as a server.  
This node has tried to access to 17 different ports including 0 on 155 different 
destination IP address, and the node showed one suspicious behavior pattern, which 
tried to access from port 26,116 to 26,196 by increasing 10 on one target IP address. 
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Therefore, the port-degrees in Figure 41.(b) showed relatively high values while the 
host-degrees in Figure 41.(a) exceed the MinTh only twice on February 23rd and May 
20th but never exceeded the MaxTh during the 90 days, so we could expect the high 
HT and low PT. Since the port-degrees exceeded 81 times during the 90 days, the low 
PRT and OT also could be expected. The results showed similar patterns to the node in 
Figure 40 that has been classified as malicious by DShield Logs and the trust 
management scheme.  
While the trust management scheme was able to detect the malicious behavior 
patterns, Figure 41.(b) also showed a weakness of the outlier-based adaptive threshold, 
which is the relatively high MaxTh. For example, the node showed exactly the same 
behaviors on May 11th and 12th, but the same behaviors were evaluated in different 
ways. The port-degree on May 12th was classified as malicious behavior while the 
behavior on May 11th was classified as suspicious due to the high MaxTh. Even 
though the behaviors were evaluated in different ways, the trust management scheme 
was able to keep the PT in low values due to the previously observed malicious 
behaviors.  
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 (a). The host-degrees of a portscan attack node in the non-URI flows 
 
 (b). The port-degrees of a portscan attack node in the non-URI flows 
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 (c). The betweenness centrality of a portscan attack node in the non-URI flows 
 
 (d). The clustering coefficient of a portscan attack node in the non-URI flows 
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 (e). The trust changes of a portscan attack node in the non-URI flows 
Figure 42. A portscan attack node that has been showed in the non-URI flows 
 
The node in Figure 42 showed even more obvious portscan behaviors than the 
nodes in Figure 40 and Figure 41. The node tried to access to 8,992 different ports 
from 49,152 to 65,531 by increasing 1 or 2 on a single node in the URI network. Thus, 
the node showed low host-degrees in Figure 41.(a) and high port-degrees in Figure 
41.(b). Our trust management scheme increased the HT while decreasing the PT, PRT, 
and OT in Figure 41.(e) based on the behaviors. We were able to detect the malicious 
behavior patterns with the low PRT and OT and specified the portscan patterns with 
the high HT and low PT. Besides the betweenness centrality in Figure 41.(c) and 
clustering coefficient in Figure 41.(d) showed that the node was not a type of attack 
that did not respect the community boundaries, so the node had high BCT and CCT. 
The node was not active from February 18th to 25th and March 11th, and the 
Figure 41.(e) showed that the inactive dates could not affect the trust calculations as 
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we designed in Section 3.3. Besides, the Figure 41.(b) showed a vulnerability of the 
adaptive threshold that was observed from May 18th to 28th. The behaviors were not 
much different from the other days that have been classified as malicious, but the 
behaviors were classified as suspicious due to the relatively high outliers on the days. 
The trust management scheme was also able to keep the low PT values with the 
previously observed malicious behaviors. 
 
4.4.2.4 Hybrid-scan attacks 
 (a). The host-degrees of a hybrid-scan attack node 
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 (b). The port-degrees of a hybrid-scan attack node 
 
 (c). The betweenness centrality of a hybrid-scan attack node 
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 (d). The clustering coefficient of a hybrid-scan attack node 
 
 (e). The trust changes of a hybrid-scan attack node 
Figure 43. A hybrid-scan attack node that has been classified as malicious 
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Figure 43 shows the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a node that 
has been listed in the DShield Logs, and the trust management scheme classified as a 
hybrid-scan node. The port-degrees and clustering coefficient values clearly showed 
malicious behaviors in Figure 43.(b) and (d), the host-degrees were placed above the 
MaxTh except on the 5th day as shown in Figure 43.(a), and the betweenness centrality 
showed higher values than the MaxTh except on the 3rd day in Figure 43.(c). 
Therefore, we cannot expect high HT, PT, CCT, BCT, PRT, or OT, and they were 
shown in Figure 43.(e).  
As we described in Section 2.6.1.3, the hybrid-scan attack nodes tend to show 
high host-degrees and port-degrees. Thus, we can specify the nodes that showed 
hybrid-scan patterns during the 14 days by searching the low HT and PT. The CCT 
and BCT showed the low value, this is one type of the attacks that do not respect 
community boundaries. The PRT and OT can also be used for detecting malicious 
nodes. 
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 (a). The host-degrees of a hybrid-scan attack node in the URI-client flows 
 
 (b). The port-degrees of a hybrid-scan attack node in the URI-client flows 
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 (c). The betweenness centrality of a hybrid-scan attack node in the URI-client 
flows 
 
 (d). The clustering coefficient of a hybrid-scan attack node in the URI-client 
flows 
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 (e). The trust changes of a hybrid-scan attack node in the URI-client flows 
Figure 44. A hybrid-scan attack node that has been showed in the URI-client 
flows 
 
Figure 44 shows the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a node in 
the URI-client flows that showed the hybrid-scan attack patterns, which was described 
in Section 2.6.1.3. The node tried to access to 4,376 different ports on 54,808 different 
destination IP addresses during the 90 days. The node showed higher host-degrees 
than the MaxTh every day, and the pot-degrees showed higher values than the MaxTh 
except on the May 11th, so we could expect the low HT and PT along with the low 
PRT and OT.  The low PRT and OT could indicate the existence of attack patterns, and 
we could specify the type of the attacks as hybrid-scan with the low HT and PT values. 
Besides, we also could indicate that the type of attacks did not respect the 
communities’ boundaries with the low BCT and CCT. 
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4.4.2.5 Misclassified nodes 
In the previous section, we looked at a few nodes that both the DShield Logs and 
our trust management scheme agreed that the nodes were malicious. On the contrary, 
we will show a few nodes that the trust management scheme suspected they were 
malicious nodes while the DShield Logs failed to classify as malicious. The looked at 
a few nodes that have behaved like the nodes in the previous section, and they can also 
be classified as malicious with the definitions in Section 2.6.1. 
 
 (a). The host-degrees of a hostscan attack node 
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 (b). The port-degrees of a hostscan attack node 
 
 (c). The betweenness centrality of a hostscan attack node 
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 (d). The clustering coefficient of a hostscan attack node 
 
 (e). The trust changes of a hostscan attack node 
Figure 45. A hostscan attack node that has not been classified as malicious 
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As we can see in Figure 45, the behaviors of the node showed very similar 
patterns to the node in Figure 37, which both the DShield Logs and our trust 
management scheme agreed the node was a hostscan attack node. Every host-degree 
was above the MaxTh except on the 6th day, and every port-degree was placed in the 
suspicious area close to the MinTh except on the 5th, 6th, and 13th days (Figure 45.(a) 
and (b)). These patterns match the signature of hostscan attack nodes that was 
presented in Section 2.6.1.1. However, the node has not been listed in the DShield 
Logs and classified as normal node while the proposed trust management scheme 
suspected that the node was a malicious node based on the low HT, CCT, BCT, PRT 
and OT, and we specified the node was a hostscan attack node based on the low HT 
and high PT. This shows that the DShield Logs failed to list all the hostscan attack 
nodes.  
 (a). The host-degrees of a portscan attack node 
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 (b). The port-degrees of a portscan attack node 
 
 (c). The betweenness centrality of a portscan attack node 
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 (d). The clustering coefficient of a portscan attack node 
 
 (e). The trust changes of a portscan attack node 
Figure 46. A portscan attack node that has not been classified as malicious 
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The node in Figure 46 also showed even more obvious behavior patterns of the 
portscan than the node in Figure 40, which both the DShield Logs and our trust 
management scheme agreed the node was a portscan attack node. The node tried to 
connect to more than 700 ports on a single destination node during the 14 days as 
shown in Figure 46.(a) and (b). However, this node also has not been listed in the 
DShield Logs and classified as normal node like the node in Figure 36. Our trust 
management scheme suspected the node was a malicious node based on the low PT, 
PRT and OT, and we specified the node was a portscan attack node based on the high 
HT and low PT. This result also shows that there is a relationship among the host-
degree, clustering coefficient, and betweenness centrality as shown in Figure 46.(c) 
and (d). Since every port-degree exceeded the MaxTh, the PRT and OT also had low 
values. 
 (a). The host-degrees of a hybrid-scan attack node 
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 (b). The port-degrees of a hybrid-scan attack node 
 
 (c). The betweenness centrality of a hybrid-scan attack node 
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 (d). The clustering coefficient of a hybrid-scan attack node 
 
 (e). The trust changes of a hybrid-scan attack node 
Figure 47. A hybrid-scan attack node that has not been classified as malicious 
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Figure 47 shows the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a node that 
was suspected of performing hybrid-scan attacks during the 14 days. The node showed 
high host-degree and port-degree in Figure 47.(a) and (b) that exceeded the MaxTh. 
The behaviors were very similar to the node in Figure 43, which was classified by the 
DShield Logs and our trust management scheme. The behavior patterns also match the 
behavior signature of a hybrid-scan attack node as described in Section 2.6.1.3. 
However, the node has not been listed in the DShield Logs and considered as a normal 
node. Our trust management scheme was able to detect the attacking behaviors with 
the low HT, PT, CCT, BCT, PRT and OT, and we specified the node was a hybrid-scan 
attack node based on the low HT and PT.  
To sum up, section 4.4 showed that the proposed trust management scheme 
successfully detected the hostscan, portscan, hybrid-scan, and any types of attacks that 
do not respect the community boundaries. Each trust value represented the behaviors 
of the host-degree, port-degree, clustering coefficient, and betweenness centrality 
respectively and used for classifying the type of attacks. Also, the experiments showed 
that the predictability trust and overall trust successfully integrated the multiple trust 
values into one. The trust management scheme also carefully evaluated each node by 
providing a cumulative evaluation method and gradually decreased the trust value as 
the system observed more malicious behaviors. Besides, we showed that the DShield 
Logs cannot be a perfect representation of all malicious nodes in section 4.4.2.5 by 
presenting a few examples that showed the same behavior patterns of scanning attacks 
but were not classified as malicious nodes.  
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4.5 The trust management scheme in special cases 
The trust management was employed for providing a method to avoid erroneously 
labeling nodes with a few malicious behaviors in a system (Section 2.4.3 and 2.6.2) 
and providing second chances to the nodes in a system with trust redemption method 
(Section 2.4.3). Thus, the trust management scheme allows redemption of the trust as 
the node behaves normally. However, some smart attacker might use the redemption 
method and could disturb the evaluation method, so the Predictability trust (PRT) has 
been developed to detect on-off attacks that the modified Beta reputation method was 
not able to detect as we discussed in Section 3.3. In this section, we will provide a few 
examples that the trust management scheme considered as a temporary error or 
suspected as malicious. Besides, this section presents the long-term redemption of the 
PRT that allows a second chance to a malicious node based on a long-term observation 
(Section 2.4.3.2). 
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4.5.1 Evaluation of one temporary error 
 (a). The betweenness centrality of a temporary error node 
 
 (b). The clustering coefficient of a temporary error node 
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 (c). The trust changes of a temporary error node 
Figure 48. A node that showed a temporary error 
 
Figure 48 shows the behaviors and the corresponding trust changes of a node that 
the trust management scheme believed  that the malicious behavior was a temporary 
error or a mistake. The node’s betweenness centrality and clustering coefficient 
showed only one malicious behavior on the 12th day as shown in Figure 48.(a) and (b), 
so the BCT and CCT were lowered once in Figure 48.(c). As the malicious behavior 
was observed, the PRT was lowered on the same day. However, it was the only one 
malicious behavior of the node, so the trust management scheme wanted to give a 
second chance by recovering the BCT and CCT from the 13th day, which the node 
showed normal behaviors again. Since the current size of the NBW was 5 and the 
current size of the MBW was 24 due to the OT value, which was 0.714 on the 14th day, 
the PRT will start recovering the value after pushing the malicious behavior out from 
the NBW, which needs to observe three more normal behaviors.  
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The secure system might produce another victim that has been stolen the identity 
by attackers if the system blocks based on a few malicious behaviors (Section 2.6.2). 
As we can see in this case, the trust management scheme can provide a second chance 
to the node because the malicious behavior could be a temporary error while it also 
does not easily recover the trust as shown in the case of PRT.  
 
4.5.2 Evaluation of on-off attacks 
 (a). The clustering coefficient of an on-off attack node 
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 (b). The trust changes of an on-off attack node 
Figure 49. A suspected on-off attack node 
 
The trust management scheme suspected that the node in Figure 49 could be an 
On-off attack node. The PRT and OT were lowered based on the malicious behaviors 
on the 3rd, 7th, 8th, and 11th days because the clustering coefficient showed malicious 
behaviors on the same days in Figure 49.(a). The behaviors in Figure 49.(a) showed a 
kind of On-off attack patterns that show normal and malicious behaviors alternatively, 
so the increase and decrease of the CCT repeatedly appeared in Figure 49.(b). As a 
result of the patterns, the CCT was bounded between 0.57 and 0.66 while the PRT 
gradually lowered the value. The Figure 49.(b) showed that the PRT has successfully 
detected the On-off patterns by extending the size of the sliding window. 
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4.5.3 Long-term redemption 
 (a). The host-degrees of a hostscan attack node in the URI-client flows 
 
 (b). The trust changes of a hostscan attack node in the URI-client flows 
Figure 50. A hostscan attack node that has been showed in the URI-client flows 
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We were able to observe that the trust management successfully specified the 
hostscan attack patterns of a node and the trust redemption in these results. Figure 50 
shows each behavior and the corresponding trust changes of a node in the URI-client 
flows that showed hostscan attack patterns, and we detected the patterns with our trust 
management scheme. The host-degrees in Figure 50.(a) exceeded every day, and we 
could expect the low HT because the behaviors matched the attack signature of 
hostscan in Section 2.6.1.1. Since the trust management scheme observed the 
malicious behaviors from the host-degrees, the PRT was decreased with the OT. 
Therefore, we were able to detect a pattern of attacks with the OT and specified the 
attack as hostscan.  
The node has tried to access to the port 80(HTTP) and 445(Microsoft Directory 
Services) on 19,926 different destination IP address. Especially, the port 445 has been 
targeted by many attackers because it has the great vulnerability originally created by 
Windows file sharing, which may allow the attackers could gain remote access to the 
contents of hard disk directories or drives [95]. After the first 17 days, the node has 
been inactive until the last observed day due to either blocked by URI firewall or 
changed the identity. There is also a possibility that the firewall blocked the IP address 
and the attack node changed the identity for the other attacks. The trust management 
scheme can provide a second chance to the IP address by pushing out the previous 
malicious behaviors from the sliding windows because it would be a waste of the 
resources if the firewall keeps blocking the IP address. So, our trust management 
scheme started recovering the PRT from May 7th gradually as shown in Figure 50.(b). 
However, if a malicious behavior happens while it was recovering the trust, it would 
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drop the trust immediately with the previously observed malicious behaviors that have 
not been pushed out from the sliding windows yet. 
 
4.6 URI summarized results 
In this section, we show the summarized analysis results of the URI dataset. In 
statistical analysis-based ADS, the systems detect malicious behaviors in low 
probability regions while the normal behaviors occur in high probability regions. 
Malicious nodes cannot be detected if a threshold is too high while normal nodes can 
be classified as malicious if a threshold is too low as we discussed in Section 2.5 and 
4.3.1. The main advantage of employing the adaptive thresholds method is that the 
system can set an appropriate threshold in a dynamic environment. We found that the 
adaptive thresholds maintained a similar pattern of the detection ratio of each normal, 
suspicious, and malicious nodes in a dynamic environment. Also, we compared the 
detection rates and the two thresholds of the adaptive thresholds method for different 
periods, which are during the semester, break, and final exam periods.  
This section only summarized the observations in the URI dataset, and the more 
detailed report for the observation will be presented in the future manuscripts. Please 
note that this section did not include the clustering coefficients. Since the values do 
not show the heavy-tailed distribution as we showed in Section 4.3.3, we did not apply 
the adaptive threshold for the clustering coefficients. 
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4.6.1 Host degrees 
On average, over the 90 days, the nodes showed higher host degrees in the order 
of URI clients (20.43), URI servers (15.95), and non-URI nodes (2.23). Therefore, the 
[Average MinTh (95% Confidence Interval) / Average MaxTh (95% Confidence 
Interval)] of the adaptive thresholds were different for each node type. The client 
nodes showed the averages [10.40 (±0.98) / 41.53 (±3.65)], the server nodes showed 
the averages [2.82 (±0.21)) / 9.10 (±1.08)], and the non-URI nodes showed the 
averages [1.43 (±0.02) / 3.88 (±1.08)].  
 
 Figure 51. The host degree-based detection rates of the client nodes 
 
In general, the thresholds of the client nodes during the semester [11.09 (±1.13) / 
43.82 (±4.13)] were greater than during the break [8.38 (±1.80) / 34.87 (±7.16)] and 
smaller than during the final exam [11.87 (±1.87) / 47.33 (±7.53)]. Figure 51 shows 
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that the detection rates of the normal, suspicious, and malicious nodes have the similar 
patterns no matter in which period the data have been collected, even though different 
time periods have different MinTh and MaxTh. At the same time, the client nodes 
show pretty different patterns between the weekdays and weekends. In general, the 
thresholds of the client nodes in the weekdays [12.93 (±0.62) / 50.90 (±2.31)] are 
greater than the thresholds in the weekends [3.44 (±0.14) / 15.75 (±0.78)], and the 
detection rates of the malicious nodes on the weekends are greater than the detection 
rates on the weekdays.  
 Figure 52. The host degree-based detection rates of the server nodes 
 
In general, the thresholds of the server nodes during the semester [3.06 (±0.24) / 
10.46 (±1.25)] are greater than during the break [2.06 (±0.19) / 5.36 (±0.99)] and 
smaller than the thresholds during the final exam [2.37 (±0.33) / 7.33 (±2.61)]. Figure 
52 also shows that the detection rates of the normal, suspicious, and malicious nodes 
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have similar patterns no matter in which period the data have been collected, even 
though different time periods  have required different MinTh and MaxTh. Meanwhile, 
unlikely the client nodes, the server nodes display very similar patterns between the 
weekdays and weekends. On average, the thresholds of the server host-degrees on the 
weekdays [3.23 (±0.21) / 11.37 (±1.05)] are greater than the thresholds on the 
weekends [1.71 (±0.09) / 3.33 (±0.30)]. Since some server nodes may work like the 
client nodes, the resulting host-degree MinTh and MaxTh are different on the 
weekdays and weekends.  
 
 Figure 53. The host degree-based detection rates of the non-URI nodes
 
While the URI nodes require relatively higher thresholds during the semester, the 
non-URI nodes have resulted in the lowest host-degree thresholds during the semester. 
In general, the thresholds during the semester [1.45 (±0.03) / 24 (±5.48)] are smaller 
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than during the break [1.37 (±0.05) / 82.22 (±27.05)] and smaller than during the final 
exams [1.37 (±0.09) / 79.00 (±62.88)]. Figure 53 shows that the normal nodes 
detection rates during the break are relatively greater than during the semester because 
the suspicious nodes detection rates have decreased during the break. However, the 
malicious nodes detection rates were similar no matter in which period the dataset has 
been collected. Meanwhile, the host-degree thresholds on the weekdays [1.41 (±0.03) / 
39.86 (±11.82)] and on the weekends [1.47 (±0.05) / 36.17 (±15.06)] show similar 
values, implying that the behaviors of non-URI nodes are not affected by the 
weekdays and weekends. The detection rates on the weekdays and weekends also 
show similar patterns. 
 
4.6.2 Port degrees 
On average, over the 90 days, the nodes show higher port degrees in the order of 
server (2.83), client (2.63), and non-URI nodes (1.17), and we have expected that the 
values [Average MinTh (95% Confidence Interval) / Average MaxTh (95% Confidence 
Interval)] of the adaptive thresholds to be placed in the same order. However, the 
adaptive thresholds have resulted in a different order. The client nodes have resulted in 
the average thresholds of [1.90 (±0.06) / 5.90 (±0.54)], the non-URI nodes have 
resulted in the averages of [1.07 (±0.00) / 2.92 (±0.06)], and the server nodes have 
resulted in the averages of [1.41 (±0.01) / 1.84 (±0.11)]. This supports the fact that the 
port degrees of the server nodes are relatively evenly distributed on each day.  
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 Figure 54. The port degree-based detection rates of the client nodes 
 
In general, the thresholds of the client nodes during the semester [1.95 (±0.07) / 
6.25 (±0.63)] are greater than during the break [1.79 (±0.14) / 4.87 (±0.98)] and 
similar to during the final exam [2.04 (±0.07) / 6.67 (±0.65)]. Figure 54 shows that the 
detection rates of the normal, suspicious, and malicious nodes result in similar patterns 
no matter in which period the data have been collected. Meanwhile, the rates of the 
normal and suspicious nodes are very different on the weekdays and weekends. The 
thresholds of the client nodes in the weekdays [2.07 (±0.04) / 7.21 (±0.40)] were 
greater than the thresholds in the weekends [1.46 (±0.04) / 2.29 (±0.19)]. If we look  
only at the detection rates on the weekdays, the detection rates of the normal nodes are 
pretty stable with the average of 73.71% and the standard deviation 4.34%. At the 
same time, the detection rates of the normal nodes on the weekends were varied with 
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the average of 65.78% and the standard deviation 17.24%. However, the detection 
rates of the malicious nodes are similar every day. 
 
 Figure 55. The port degree-based detection rates of the server nodes 
 
In general, the thresholds of the server nodes during the semester [1.42 (±0.02) / 
2.00 (±0.00)] were similar to during the break [1.35 (±0.02) / 2.00 (±0.00)] and similar 
to during the final [1.39 (±0.02) / 2.00 (±0.00)]. The detection rates of the normal, 
suspicious, and malicious nodes changed many times as shown in Figure 55. However, 
the detection rates of the malicious nodes were relatively stable compare to the normal 
and suspicious nodes with the average 6.94% and standard deviation 3.59%. 
Meanwhile, the thresholds in the weekdays [1.44 (±0.01) / 2.00 (±0.0)] and in the 
weekends [1.31 (±0.01) / 2.00 (±0.00)] did not affect a lot to the detection rates of the 
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malicious nodes; average 4.90% and standard deviation 3.79% in the weekdays and 
average 7.68% and standard deviation 3.24% in the weekends.  
 
 Figure 56. The port degree-based detection rates of the non-URI nodes
 
We observed that the periods of the data collection do not affect a lot to the port 
degree-based detection of the normal, suspicious, and malicious nodes in non-URI 
nodes. In general, the thresholds of the non-URI nodes during the semester [1.08 
(±0.00) / 2.99 (±0.03)] were similar to during the break [1.07 (±0.01) / 2.74 (±0.22)] 
and similar to during the final [1.08 (±0.01) / 3.00 (±0.00)]. Meanwhile, the thresholds 
of the nodes in the weekdays [1.07 (±0.00) / 2.94 (±0.07)] were also similar to the 
thresholds in the weekends [1.08 (±0.01) / 2.88 (±0.14)]. As shown in Figure 56, the 
detection rates of the normal, suspicious, and malicious nodes maintained similar 
patterns for the 90 days no matter in which period the dataset has been collected.  
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4.6.3 Betweenness centrality 
On average, over the 90 days, the nodes showed higher betweenness centrality 
values in the order of non-URI (59273.84), server (3163.00), and client (2609.06). We 
also expected that the [Average MinTh (95% Confidence Interval) / Average MaxTh 
(95% Confidence Interval)]  of the adaptive threshold will be higher in the order of the 
average betweenness centrality values. However, the non-URI nodes showed the 
averages [66299.43 (±6330.96) / 489598.11 (±107872.60)], the client nodes showed 
the averages [1131.25 (±58.29) / 4087.00 (±161.99)], and the server showed the 
averages [264.90 (±41.51) / 976.75 (±159.97)]. These values also showed that the 
betweenness centrality values of the server nodes were relatively evenly distributed on 
each day. 
 
 Figure 57. The betweenness centrality-based detection rates of the client nodes
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In general, the thresholds of the client nodes during the semester [1172.13 
(±66.20) / 4194.34 (±176.12)] were greater than during the break [1012.17 (±110.25) / 
3774.31 (±348.37)] and slightly smaller than during the final [1142.43 (±211.72) / 
4287.33 (±559.24)]. Figure 57 shows that the detection rates of the normal, suspicious, 
and malicious nodes showed the similar patterns no matter in which period the dataset 
has been collected with the different MinTh and MaxTh. Meanwhile, the thresholds of 
the client nodes in the weekdays [1272.24 (±42.55) / 4453.63 (±133.18)] were greater 
than the thresholds in the weekends [743.55 (±31.50) / 3078.76 (±106.71)]. The 
detection rates of the malicious nodes in the weekdays, which showed the average 
14.60% with standard deviation 0.79%, showed more stable detection rates than in the 
weekends, which showed the average 18.27% with the standard deviation 6.59%. 
 
 Figure 58. The betweenness centrality-based detection rates of the server nodes
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In general, the thresholds of the server nodes during the semester [310.11 
(±49.07) / 1198.24 (±189.42)] were greater than during the break [124.97 (±34.22) / 
477.23 (±143.65)] and greater than during the final [158.74 (±91.43) / 678.87 
(±511.77)]. As shown in Figure 58, the detection rates of the normal, suspicious, and 
malicious nodes also showed the similar patterns no matter in which period the dataset 
has been collected with the different MinTh and MaxTh. Meanwhile, the thresholds of 
the client nodes in the weekdays [342.02 (±41.20) / 1130.38 (±155.87)] were greater 
than the thresholds in the weekends [40.56 (±8.87) / 125.61 (±28.60)]. The detection 
rates of the malicious nodes in the weekdays, which showed the average 13.48% with 
standard deviation 0.76%, showed more stable detection rates than in the weekends, 
which showed the average 16.34% with the standard deviation 2.17%. 
 
 Figure 59. The betweenness centrality-based detection rates of the non-URI 
nodes 
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In general, the thresholds of the server nodes during the semester [67997.48 
(±7442.53) / 535542.23 (±139805.04)] were greater than during the break [61352.92 
(±12028.11) / 355760.87 (±95888.34)] and greater than during the final [48243.67 
(±2272.85) / 200748.90 (±21810.49)]. Figure 59 shows that the detection rates of the 
normal, suspicious, and malicious nodes showed the similar patterns no matter in 
which period the dataset has been collected with the different MinTh and MaxTh. 
Meanwhile, the thresholds of the client nodes in the weekdays [71832.59 (±7721.01) / 
519506.80 (±135633.33)] were greater than the thresholds in the weekends [51083.21 
(±8097.82) / 407349.18 (±156022.24)]. Figure 59 also shows that the detection rates 
were not affected by the weekdays and weekends. 
 
4.7 Summary 
Chapter 4 evaluated the proposed ADS with multiple experiments. Section 4.1 
showed that the graph representation can reduce the network flows dataset drastically, 
and Section 4.2 showed the trust management scheme can represent the results of 
statistical analysis methods. Section 4.3 compared the adaptive threshold to static 
thresholds and showed the adaptive threshold works better than the static thresholds in 
a dynamic environment. Section 4.4 showed that the converted trust values were able 
to detect the hostscan, portscan, hybrid-scan, and the types of attacks that do not 
respect the community boundaries. The section also showed that the proposed method 
can detect the attacks that even the DShield Logs [7] or Firewall could not detect. 
Section 4.5 presented how the trust management scheme deals with three special 
cases; 1) there was a temporary error looked like an attack, 2) if an attack node 
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composed on-off attack to disturb the trust management scheme, and 3) how the trust 
management scheme provides a second chance to a node. Section 4.6 summarized the 
analysis results of the URI dataset and showed the detection rates of the URI nodes, 
especially the client nodes, were affected by the weekdays and weekends due to the 
different number of active nodes on campus while the non-URI maintained similar 
detection rates with the different thresholds. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
In this final chapter, the main achievements of this research are summarized. 
Moreover, there exist several directions that would help in further improving and 
advancing the efficiency of the system.  
This chapter will summarize the main achievements of this research from five 
perspectives: the graph representation of network flows, characterization of each node 
by using statistical analysis methods, representation of the results by using a trust 
management scheme, the adaptive threshold, and the trust management scheme for 
providing a method to avoid erroneously labeling nodes with a few malicious 
behaviors. A summary of the experimental results will be presented, and this 
dissertation closes with a brief discussion of future directions. 
This dissertation showed that the graph representation can reduce the dataset by 
removing duplicated relationships and the statistical analysis on the graph can 
characterize each node’s behaviors. Also, we showed that how the trust management 
can overcome the disadvantages of the statistical analysis-based IDS. The results that 
were produced by statistical analyses were not intuitive because it was not clear 
whether the bigger number meant normal or malicious. For instance, the high numbers 
in the host-degree, port-degree, and betweenness centrality represent the malicious 
behaviors while the low numbers in the clustering coefficient would be malicious. By 
representing the results in the trust management scheme, we were able to produce 
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intuitive results, which the low trust value represents more malicious. Moreover, the 
trust management scheme made it possible to integrate various results of statistical 
analysis methods into one by converting the results in the same range, between 0 and 
1. We showed that the adaptive threshold worked better than static thresholds in a 
dynamic environment because if a static threshold is too low, the rate of false positive 
will be excessive, and if the threshold is too high, detection rate will be low. In 
addition to the efficiency, the trust management scheme with the adaptive threshold 
was able to represent how much the behavior closer to the normal or malicious 
behavior. Moreover, a secure system needs to carefully evaluate each node before 
blocking the suspicious nodes because there exist many methods that can hide the 
identity of the attackers, and many normal users can be affected. The proposed ADS 
could evaluate each node cautiously by providing cumulative evaluation by using the 
trust management scheme with the adaptive threshold and could also detect the attacks 
that even the DShield Logs or Firewall could not detect. 
In our further work, we will show more analysis results of the URI dataset to 
show the usability of the adaptive thresholds. We also would like to analyze more than 
the host-degree, port-degree, betweenness centrality, and clustering coefficient. Since 
we have collected more than the IP addresses and port information of the source and 
destination nodes, the statistical analysis methods can be applied to the other 
information, such as the countries, size of the packets, the location of the nods in the 
university, the types of application, etc. The datasets may be considered as a big data, 
and there exist many big data analysis methods. In the future research, we will apply 
big data analysis methods and detect malicious behaviors in the network flows. 
175 
 
APPENDIX I 
PSUEDOCODEDS 
A. Pseudocode for the predictability trust 
( NPB, MPB ) ← getPRTStatus ( bv_1, bv_2, bv_3, bv_4, NPB, MPB ) 
( bv_1.GB, bv_1.BB ) ← CALL getBVStatus ( bv_1 ) 
( bv_2.GB, bv_2.BB ) ← CALL getBVStatus ( bv_2 ) 
( bv_3.GB, bv_3.BB ) ← CALL getBVStatus ( bv_3 ) 
( bv_4.GB, bv_4.BB ) ← CALL getBVStatus ( bv_4 ) 
 
IF bv_1.BB == 1 || bv_2.BB == 1 || bv_3.BB == 1 || bv_4.BB == 1 
                NPB ← 0; 
                MPB ← 1; 
ELIF bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.GB == 1 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
ELIF bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.BB == 0 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.BB == 0 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
ELIF bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.BB == 0 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
ELIF bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.BB == 0 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.BB == 0 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
ELIF bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.BB == 0 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.GB == 1 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
ELIF bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.BB == 0 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
ELIF bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.BB == 0 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.BB == 0 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.BB == 0 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.GB == 1 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
ELIF bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.BB == 0 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
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ELIF bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.GB == 1 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
ELIF bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.BB == 0 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.GB == 1 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
ELIF bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.BB == 0 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
ELIF bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.GB == 1 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
ELIF bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.GB == 1 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.GB == 1 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
ELIF bv_1.GB == 1 && bv_2.BB == 0 && bv_3.GB == 1 && bv_4.GB == 1 
                NPB ← 1; 
                MPB ← 0; 
ELIF bv_1.GB == 0 && bv_1.BB == 0 && bv_2.GB == 0 && bv_2.BB == 0 && 
bv_3.GB == 0 && bv_3.BB == 0 && bv_4.GB == 0 && bv_4.BB == 0 
                NPB ← 0; 
                MPB ← 0; 
ELSE 
                DISP(‘ERROR’) 
END IF 
RETURN NPB, MPB 
  
( GB, BB ) ← getBVStatus ( bv ) 
IF bv.bv >= bv.MaxTh 
      GB ← 0 
      BB ← 1 
ELIF bv.bv <= bv.MinTh 
      GB ← 1 
      BB ← 0 
ELSE 
      GB ← 0 
      BB ← 0 
END IF 
RETURN GB, BB 
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B. Pseudocodes for the Everyday malicious pattern-based ROC curves 
( TPR, FPR ) ← getEverydayROC ( ip_list, dataset ) 
TPR ← Ø 
FPR ← Ø 
degree_threshold = minimum degree 
WHILE degree_threshold ≠ ( maximum degree + 1 ) 
      ( ret ) ← isEveryday ( ip_list, dataset, degree_threshold ) 
      ( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) ← calcEverydayROC ( ip_list, ret ) 
      TPR ← [ TPR, TMP_TPR ] 
      FPR ← [ FPR, TMP_FPR ] 
      INCREMENT degree_threshold by 1 
END WHILE 
RETURN TPR, FPR 
 
( RET ) ← isEveryday ( ip_list, dataset, degree_threshold ) 
RET ← initialize list with TRUEs 
FOR each day 
      FOR each behavior of each node 
            IF behavior [ node_id ] < degree_threshold 
                  RET [ node_id ] ← FALSE 
            END IF 
      END FOR 
END FOR 
RETURN RET 
 
( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) = calcEverydayROC ( ip_list, isEveryday ) 
TP ← 0 
TN ← 0 
FP ← 0 
FN ← 0 
FOR each isEveryday of the matching ip_list 
      IF isEveryday [ node_id ] == TURE AND listed in DShield Logs 
            TP ← TP + 1 
      ELIF isEveryday [ node_id ]  == FALSE AND listed in DShield Logs 
            FN ← FN + 1 
      ELIF isEveryday [ node_id ] == TRUE AND not listed in DShield Logs 
            FP ← FP + 1 
      ELIF isEveryday [ node_id ] == FALSE AND not listed in DShield Logs 
            TN ← TN + 1 
      END IF 
END FOR 
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TMP_TPR ← ( TP ) / ( TP + FN ) 
TMP_FPR ← ( FP ) / ( TN + FP ) 
 
RETURN TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR 
 
C. Pseudocodes for the malicious Average degree pattern-based ROC curves 
( TPR, FPR ) ← getAverageROC ( ip_list, dataset ) 
TPR ← Ø 
FPR ← Ø 
degree_threshold = minimum degree 
WHILE degree_threshold ≠ ( maximum degree + 1 ) 
      ( ret ) ← getAverage ( ip_list, dataset ) 
      ( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) ← calcAverageROC ( ip_list, ret, degree_threshold ) 
      TPR ← [ TPR, TMP_TPR ] 
      FPR ← [ FPR, TMP_FPR ] 
      INCREMENT degree_threshold by 1 
END WHILE 
RETURN TPR, FPR 
 
( RET ) ← getAverage ( ip_list, dataset ) 
RET ← initialize list with 0s 
FOR each behavior of each node 
      SUM ← 0 
      FOR each day 
            SUM ← SUM + behavior [ node_id ] 
      END FOR 
      RET [ node_id ] ← SUM / Number of Days 
END FOR 
RETURN RET 
 
( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) = calcAverageROC ( ip_list, averages, degree_threshold ) 
TP ← 0 
TN ← 0 
FP ← 0 
FN ← 0 
FOR each average of the matching ip_list 
      IF averages [ node_id ] ≥ degree_threshold AND listed in DShield Logs 
            TP ← TP + 1 
      ELIF averages [ node_id ] < degree_threshold AND listed in DShield Logs 
            FN ← FN + 1 
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      ELIF averages [ node_id ] ≥ degree_threshold AND not listed in DShield Logs 
            FP ← FP + 1 
      ELIF averages [ node_id ] < degree_threshold AND not listed in DShield Logs 
            TN ← TN + 1 
      END IF 
END FOR 
TMP_TPR ← ( TP ) / ( TP + FN ) 
TMP_FPR ← ( FP ) / ( TN + FP ) 
 
RETURN TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR 
 
D. Pseudocodes for the At Least Once malicious pattern-based ROC curves 
( TPR, FPR ) ← getAtLeastOnceROC ( ip_list, dataset ) 
TPR ← Ø 
FPR ← Ø 
degree_threshold = minimum degree 
WHILE degree_threshold ≠ ( maximum degree + 1 ) 
      ( ret ) ← isAtLeastOnce ( ip_list, dataset, degree_threshold ) 
      ( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) ← calcAtLeastOnceROC ( ip_list, ret ) 
      TPR ← [ TPR, TMP_TPR ] 
      FPR ← [ FPR, TMP_FPR ] 
      INCREMENT degree_threshold by 1 
END WHILE 
RETURN TPR, FPR 
 
( RET ) ← isAtLeastOnce ( ip_list, dataset, degree_threshold ) 
RET ← initialize list with FALSEs 
FOR each day 
      FOR each behavior of each node 
            IF behavior [ node_id ] ≥ degree_threshold 
                  RET [ node_id ] ← TRUE 
            END IF 
      END FOR 
END FOR 
RETURN RET 
 
( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) = calcAtLeastOnceROC ( ip_list, isAtLeastOnce ) 
TP ← 0 
TN ← 0 
FP ← 0 
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FN ← 0 
FOR each isAtLeastOnce of the matching ip_list 
      IF isAtLeastOnce [ node_id ] == TURE AND listed in DShield Logs 
            TP ← TP + 1 
      ELIF isAtLeastOnce [ node_id ]  == FALSE AND listed in DShield Logs 
            FN ← FN + 1 
      ELIF isAtLeastOnce [ node_id ] == TRUE AND not listed in DShield Logs 
            FP ← FP + 1 
      ELIF isAtLeastOnce [ node_id ] == FALSE AND not listed in DShield Logs 
            TN ← TN + 1 
      END IF 
END FOR 
TMP_TPR ← ( TP ) / ( TP + FN ) 
TMP_FPR ← ( FP ) / ( TN + FP ) 
 
RETURN TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR 
 
E. Pseudocodes for the trust-based ROC curves 
( TPR_LIST, FPR_LIST ) ← startTrustROC ( ip_list, dataset ) 
TPR_LIST ← Ø 
FPR_LIST ← Ø 
trust_threshold ← 0.1 
WHILE trust_threshold ≠ 1.0 ) 
      ( TPR, FPR ) ← getTrustROC ( ip_list, dataset, trust_threshold ) 
      TPR_LIST ← [ TPR_LIST; TPR ] 
      FPR_LIST ← [ FPR_LIST; FPR ] 
      INCREMENT trust_threshold by 0.1 
END WHILE 
RETURN TPR_LIST, FPR_LIST 
  
( TPR, FPR ) ← getTrustROC ( ip_list, dataset, trust_threshold ) 
TPR ← Ø 
FPR ← Ø 
degree_threshold ← minimum degree 
WHILE degree_threshold ≠ ( maximum degree + 1 ) 
      ( trust ) ← calcTrust ( ip_list, dataset, degree_threshold ) 
      ( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) ← calcTrustROC ( ip_list, trust, trust_threshold ) 
      TPR ← [ TPR, TMP_TPR ] 
      FPR ← [ FPR, TMP_FPR ] 
      INCREMENT degree_threshold by 1 
END WHILE 
RETURN TPR, FPR 
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( TRUST ) ← calcTrust ( ip_list, dataset, degree_threshold ) 
TRUST ← initialize list with 0s 
gb ← initialize list with 0s 
bb ← initialize list with 0s 
FOR each day 
      FOR each behavior of each node 
            IF behavior [ node_id ] < degree_threshold 
                  gb [ node_id ] ← gb [ node_id ]  + 1 
            ELSE 
                  bb [ node_id ] ← bb [ node_id ]  + 1 
            END IF 
      END FOR 
END FOR 
TRUST [ node_id ] ← ( gb [ node_id ] + 1 ) / ( gb [ node_id ] + bb [ node_id ] + 2 ) 
RETURN TRUST 
  
( TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR ) = calcTrustROC ( ip_list, trust, trust_threshold ) 
TP ← 0 
TN ← 0 
FP ← 0 
FN ← 0 
last_day_trust ← last column of the trust 
FOR each trust in last_day_trust 
      IF last_day_trust [ node_id ] ≤ trust_threshold AND listed in DShield Logs 
            TP ← TP + 1 
      ELIF last_day_trust [ node_id ]  > trust_threshold AND listed in DShield Logs 
            FN ← FN + 1 
      ELIF last_day_trust [ node_id ] ≤ trust_threshold AND not listed in DShield Logs 
            FP ← FP + 1 
      ELIF last_day_trust [ node_id ] > trust_threshold AND not listed in DShield Logs 
            TN ← TN + 1 
      END IF 
END FOR 
TMP_TPR ← ( TP ) / ( TP + FN ) 
TMP_FPR ← ( FP ) / ( TN + FP ) 
 
RETURN TMP_TPR, TMP_FPR 
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F. Pseudocodes for the outlier-based adaptive threshold 
( MAX_TH, MIN_TH ) ← getThresholds ( dataset ) 
delta ← 0.05 
sorted_dataset ← sort the dataset in descend order 
kappa ← number of data / 4 
k ← 1 
WHILE k < Number of data 
      alpha ← CALL calcModifiedHill ( sorted_dataset, k, kappa ) 
      r_i ← ( 1 - ( 1 – delta ) ^ ( 1 / k ) ) ^ ( -1 / ( alpha * k ) ) 
      R_i ← sorted_dataset [ k ] / sorted_dataset [ k + 1] 
      IF R_i > r_i 
            MAX_TH ← sorted_dataset [ k + 1 ] 
            refined_data ← remove the outliers from the sorted_dataset 
            MIN_TH ← mean ( refined_data ) 
            RETURN MAX_TH, MIN_TH 
      END IF 
      INCREMENT k by 1 
END WHILE 
RETURN FAIL 
  
( ALPHA ) ← calcModifiedHill ( sorted_dataset, k, kappa ) 
X_k ← sorted_dataset [ k ] 
X_kappa ← sorted_dataset [ kappa ] 
 
log_sum ← 0 
log_index ← k 
WHILE log_index ≠ ( kappa + 1 ) 
      log_sum ← log_sum + log ( sorted_dataset [ log_index ] ) 
      INCREMENT log_index by 1 
END WHILE 
 
ALPHA ← ( ( ( k – 1 ) / ( kappa - ( k – 1 ) ) ) * log ( X_k ) - ( ( kappa – 1 ) / ( kappa - 
( k – 1 ) ) ) * log ( X_kapa ) + ( 1 / ( kappa - ( k – 1 ) ) ) * log_sum ) ^ ( -1 
) 
 
RETURN ALPHA 
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G. NPB and MPB for the predictability trust 
( NPB, MPB ) ← getEvaluation ( host_degree, port_degree,  
                                                        h_max, h_min, p_max, p_min ) 
NPB ← 0 
MPB ← 0 
day ← 1 
WHILE day < (Number of days + 1) 
      IF host_degree [ day ] >= h_max 
            h_bb ← 1 
            h_gb ← 0 
      ELIF host_degree [ day ] <= h_min 
            h_bb ← 0 
            h_gb ← 1 
      ELSE 
            h_bb ← 0 
            h_gb ← 0 
      END IF 
 
      IF port_degree [ day ] >= p_max 
            p_bb ← 1 
            p_gb ← 0 
      ELIF port_degree [ day ] <= p_min 
            p_bb ← 0 
            p_gb ← 1 
      ELSE 
            p_bb ← 0 
            p_gb ← 0 
      END IF 
 
      IF ( h_bb == 1 && p_bb == 1 ) || ( h_bb == 1 && p_bb == 0 ) ||  
           ( h_bb == 0 && p_bb == 1 ) 
            NPB ← NPB + 0 
            MPB ← MPB + 1 
      ELIF h_gb == 1 && h_bb == 1 
            NPB ← NPB + 1 
            MPB ← MPB + 0 
      ELSE 
            NPB ← NPB + 0 
            MPB ← MPB + 0 
      END IF 
      INCREMENT day by 1 
END WHILE 
RETURN NPB, MPB 
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APPENDIX II 
TABLES 
A. Comparisons of the amount of dataset being analyzed in the European 
dataset  
Day  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Original  2033520  2582552 2658580 2591969 1857031 1986025  2864999
Graph  338919  479894 476489 426867 242404 268617  489119
Saved  83.3%  81.4% 82.1% 83.5% 86.9% 86.5%  82.9%
Day  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
Original  2983068  2841339 2884174 2639961 1990954 1970922  2762730
Graph  513891  523543 523104 458629 264846 283987  523031
Saved  82.8%  81.6% 81.9% 82.6% 86.7% 85.6%  81.1%
 a) Comparisons of the amount of IP addresses to be analyzed between the 
original and graph represented in the European dataset 
Day  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Original  2033520  2582552 2658580 2591969 1857031 1986025  2864999
Graph  449164  569886 561409 532058 366307 408868  593437
Saved  77.9%  77.9% 78.9% 79.5% 80.3% 79.4%  79.3%
Day  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
Original  2983068  2841339 2884174 2639961 1990954 1970922  2762730
Graph  576659  570111 583733 537062 381646 385751  565519
Saved  80.7%  79.9% 79.8% 79.7% 80.8% 80.4%  79.5%
 b) Comparisons of the amount of ports to be analyzed between the original 
and graph represented in the European dataset 
 
B. Comparisons of the amount of dataset being analyzed in the URI dataset 
Day  1  2 3 4 5 6  7
Original  243790  341427 280573 244027 239039 143410  144945
Graph  152678  180531 176662 142146 150214 80086  84414
Saved  37.4%  47.1% 37.0% 41.8% 37.2% 44.2%  41.8%
Day  8  9 10 11 12 13  14
Original  267088  271934 276411 268633 236520 144232  160232
Graph  169553  169272 173777 167295 150696 90969  96034
Saved  36.5%  37.8% 37.1% 37.7% 36.3% 36.9%  40.1%
Day  15  16 17 18 19 20  21
Original  283563  271568 297094 292063 248845 153801  173922
Graph  175528  173179 188807 186227 157337 93485  103471
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Saved  38.1%  36.2% 36.5% 36.2% 36.8% 39.2%  40.5%
Day  22  23 24 25 26 27  28
Original  297167  285278 290520 309071 49516 87645  236083
Graph  182704  175760 176831 199923 34103 50921  146806
Saved  38.5%  38.4% 39.1% 35.3% 31.1% 41.9%  37.8%
Day  29  30 31 32 33 34  35
Original  221660  139798 149500 293320 295133 294104  317198
Graph  144689  86955 89171 184082 185555 185840  183723
Saved  34.7%  37.8% 40.4% 37.2% 37.1% 36.8%  42.1%
Day  36  37 38 39 40 41  42
Original  266514  168503 171537 314527 310587 321669  305103
Graph  174452  106587 103356 194957 188491 190148  181163
Saved  34.5%  36.7% 39.8% 38.0% 39.3% 40.9%  40.6%
Day  43  44 45 46 47 48  49
Original  279160  200273 189714 348489 320224 304232  291077
Graph  158559  93825 94090 202633 181879 181016  177446
Saved  43.2%  53.2% 50.4% 41.9% 43.2% 40.5%  39.0%
Day  50  51 52 53 54 55  56
Original  258292  168184 171474 302885 314768 327262  369205
Graph  157300  92751 90253 176488 177188 186313  192132
Saved  39.1%  44.9% 47.4% 41.7% 43.7% 43.1%  48.0%
Day  57  58 59 60 61 62  63
Original  315119  189703 195809 317470 308328 314982  299310
Graph  170140  93570 94352 185025 184978 191340  181010
Saved  46.0%  50.7% 51.8% 41.7% 40.0% 39.3%  39.5%
Day  64  65 66 67 68 69  70
Original  268504  181580 177183 345831 232169 160125  283543
Graph  153877  90026 87145 185174 133289 103928  177553
Saved  42.7%  50.4% 50.8% 46.5% 42.6% 35.1%  37.4%
Day  71  72 73 74 75 76  77
Original  252928  181854 148693 251745 258205 262348  246732
Graph  166431  98794 95722 162970 170592 171897  165830
Saved  34.2%  45.7% 35.6% 35.3% 33.9% 34.5%  32.8%
Day  78  79 80 81 82 83  84
Original  231042  148227 211136 335357 271628 261328  281513
Graph  157776  95782 96560 156789 158284 156270  175134
Saved  31.7%  35.4% 54.3% 53.3% 41.7% 40.2%  37.8%
Day  85  86 87 88 89 90    
Original  264349  171762 150282 168142 331850 317282    
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Graph  164315  99023 82552 96148 178288 160511    
Saved  37.8%  42.4% 45.1% 42.8% 46.3% 49.4%    
 a) Comparisons of the amount of IP addresses to be analyzed between the 
original and graph represented in the URI dataset 
Day  1  2 3 4 5 6  7
Original  243790  341427 280573 244027 239039 143410  144945
Graph  51137  70860 57723 54160 49252 36872  38488
Saved  79.0%  79.3% 79.4% 77.8% 79.4% 74.3%  73.5%
Day  8  9 10 11 12 13  14
Original  267088  271934 276411 268633 236520 144232  160232
Graph  51476  50711 50192 48844 47054 37168  40263
Saved  80.7%  81.4% 81.8% 81.8% 80.1% 74.2%  74.9%
Day  15  16 17 18 19 20  21
Original  283563  271568 297094 292063 248845 153801  173922
Graph  51602  51352 55454 56533 50321 38386  41865
Saved  81.8%  81.1% 81.3% 80.6% 79.8% 75.0%  75.9%
Day  22  23 24 25 26 27  28
Original  297167  285278 290520 309071 49516 87645  236083
Graph  55260  53263 51917 55061 10904 22935  47875
Saved  81.4%  81.3% 82.1% 82.2% 78.0% 73.8%  79.7%
Day  29  30 31 32 33 34  35
Original  221660  139798 149500 293320 295133 294104  317198
Graph  45951  34570 36403 54196 53479 53691  53663
Saved  79.3%  75.3% 75.7% 81.5% 81.9% 81.7%  83.1%
Day  36  37 38 39 40 41  42
Original  266514  168503 171537 314527 310587 321669  305103
Graph  51474  38008 39634 54101 54374 55391  52845
Saved  80.7%  77.4% 76.9% 82.8% 82.5% 82.8%  82.7%
Day  43  44 45 46 47 48  49
Original  279160  200273 189714 348489 320224 304232  291077
Graph  49524  36848 38360 54292 55414 53412  54683
Saved  82.3%  81.6% 79.8% 84.4% 82.7% 82.4%  81.2%
Day  50  51 52 53 54 55  56
Original  258292  168184 171474 302885 314768 327262  369205
Graph  49866  38251 36051 54035 54371 56143  54397
Saved  80.7%  77.3% 79.0% 82.2% 82.7% 82.8%  85.3%
Day  57  58 59 60 61 62  63
Original  315119  189703 195809 317470 308328 314982  299310
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Graph  50512  36271 39530 56385 56927 55849  54704
Saved  84.0%  80.9% 79.8% 82.2% 81.5% 82.3%  81.7%
Day  64  65 66 67 68 69  70
Original  268504  181580 177183 345831 232169 160125  283543
Graph  50862  37335 36893 57515 42333 35329  54775
Saved  81.1%  79.4% 79.2% 83.4% 81.8% 77.9%  80.7%
Day  71  72 73 74 75 76  77
Original  252928  181854 148693 251745 258205 262348  246732
Graph  52090  39892 39720 55448 55962 56075  55283
Saved  79.4%  78.1% 73.3% 78.0% 78.3% 78.6%  77.6%
Day  78  79 80 81 82 83  84
Original  231042  148227 211136 335357 271628 261328  281513
Graph  51767  38159 44680 65098 65982 71880  75169
Saved  77.6%  74.3% 78.8% 80.6% 75.7% 72.5%  73.3%
Day  85  86 87 88 89 90    
Original  264349  171762 150282 168142 331850 317282    
Graph  76600  62297 54744 55458 75284 73781    
Saved  71.0%  63.7% 63.6% 67.0% 77.3% 76.8%    
 b) Comparisons of the amount of ports to be analyzed between the original 
and graph represented in the URI dataset 
 
C. The intersections between the adaptive and each static threshold in the host-
degree analysis ROC curves 
 Static-5 Static-7 Static-9 
TPR FPR TPR FPR TPR FPR 
Day 1 0.783537 0.207009 0.670732 0.154375 0.615854 0.125380
Day 2 0.786996 0.192407 0.710762 0.143458 0.643498 0.115227
Day 3 0.83683 0.197340 0.745921 0.144571 0.650350 0.115227
Day 4 0.78836 0.202299 0.708995 0.149422 0.640212 0.12152 
Day 5 0.77 0.271609 0.693333 0.207444 0.6 0.167518
Day 6 0.791304 0.259221 0.692754 0.194712 0.608696 0.158796
Day 7 0.729282 0.185759 0.646409 0.134352 0.576427 0.107686
Day 8 0.765531 0.184705 0.689379 0.134365 0.607214 0.108346
Day 9 0.769231 0.191047 0.665992 0.14098 0.603239 0.113393
188 
 
Day 10 0.740654 0.193691 0.635514 0.143678 0.565421 0.116319
Day 11 0.751351 0.198135 0.686486 0.146777 0.640541 0.118154
Day 12 0.763158 0.268392 0.674342 0.202611 0.595395 0.165226
Day 13 0.744681 0.257072 0.659574 0.192075 0.606383 0.157579
Day 14 0.827703 0.187601 0.756757 0.137017 0.699324 0.109715
  
D. The intersections between the adaptive and each static threshold in the port-
degree analysis ROC curves 
 Static-5 Static-7 Static-9 
TPR FPR TPR FPR TPR FPR 
Day 1 0.77439 0.202861 0.557927 0.111695 0.542683 0.10423 
Day 2 0.780269 0.193573 0.562780 0.11059 0.542601 0.105166
Day 3 0.822844 0.187947 0.564103 0.104642 0.550117 0.098941
Day 4 0.78836 0.1894 0.579365 0.104382 0.558201 0.099076
Day 5 N/A N/A 0.513333 0.149677 0.5 0.141064
Day 6 N/A N/A 0.527536 0.160788 0.498551 0.153034
Day 7 0.725599 0.185973 0.506446 0.103004 0.480663 0.097799
Day 8 0.761523 0.172533 0.54509 0.092423 0.527054 0.86809 
Day 9 0.748988 0.176256 0.514170 0.095122 0.483806 0.08977 
Day 10 0.738318 0.178390 0.502336 0.097056 0.485981 0.091386
Day 11 0.751351 0.183936 0.548649 0.101758 0.535135 0.095109
Day 12 N/A N/A 0.529605 0.148967 0.513158 0.141639
Day 13 N/A N/A 0.56383 0.148294 0.542553 0.140574
Day 14 0.790541 0.173059 0.614865 0.0938 0.594595 0.088407
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